Three Essays in Macroeconometrics by Colombo, Valentina
Università degli studi di padova
Sede Amministrativa: Università degli Studi di Padova
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali Marco Fanno
scuola di dottorato di ricerca in
economia e management
ciclo XXVII
Three Essays in Macroeconometrics
Direttore della Scuola: Ch.mo Prof. Giorgio Brunello
Supervisore: Ch.mo Prof. Efrem Castelnuovo
Dottorando: Valentina Colombo

Abstract
This dissertation comprises three self-contained chapters in macroeconometrics
tackling three current macroeconomic issues.
The first chapter, Economic Policy Uncertainty in the US: Does it matter for the
Euro Area", is a single-authored paper. It studies to what extent an economic
policy uncertainty shock generated in the US triggers spillover effects in the Euro
Area macroeconomic activity. I estimate a two-country Structural Vector Au-
toregressive (SVAR) model capturing the US economic policy uncertainty shock
by appealing to some indicators recently proposed by Baker, Bloom and Davis
(2013). The impulse responses predict a negative and statistically significant reac-
tion of Euro area price and quantity indicators to an unexpected increase in the US
policy uncertainty. The results support the view that the effects of such shock act
like a demand "type" shock. Interestingly, the Euro area variables are estimated
to respond strongly to US uncertainty shock than to the European counterpart.
A note from this chapter has been published in the Economics Letters.
The second chapter, "Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News from a non-linear Word",
is a joint work with Giovanni Caggiano, Efrem Castelnuovo and Gabriela Nodari.
We estimate the effects of a US government spending news shock on output multi-
pliers. We deal with the issue of fiscal foresight (anticipated fiscal policy changes)
by appealing to the sums of revisions of expectations on future government spend-
ing. This measure is used to add more information to a standard three-variate
fiscal VAR model à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). To study the effects of an-
ticipated fiscal policy shocks conditionally on the state of economy (in recessions
and expansions), we estimate a non-linear VAR (Smooth Transition VAR). We
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compute non-linear generalized impulse responses (GIRFs) à la Koop, Pesaran,
and Potter (1996) to take into account the probability of smoothly switching from
a regime to another due to the fiscal shock. Results show that an anticipated
fiscal spending shock triggers a significant reaction of GDP. Such reaction is not
significantly different between recessions and expansions. However, when we dis-
criminate between "extreme events" (i.e., the recent great recession), we find a
reaction of output significantly different among regimes. Fiscal multipliers in re-
cessions are estimated above one and government spending news shocks are found
to induce economic stabilization. This chapter is forthcoming in the Economic
Journal.
The third chapter, "Opening the Red Budget Box: Real Effects of a Tax Shock
in the UK", is a single-authored paper. It studies non-linear impulse responses
to unanticipated tax shocks for output and its components. To do so, I estimate
a non-linear version of the local projection technique developed by Jordá (2005).
The identification of the tax shock is achieved by appealing to the measure of
exogenous tax changes in the UK developed by Cloyne (2013). Tax shocks are
found to affect UK macroeconomic variables depending when such shocks occur
(in recessions or in expansions). An unexpected increase in the tax rate occurring
in recessions triggers a large, persistent and negative reaction in output, consump-
tion, investment, imports and government consumption. The results suggest that
output tax multipliers are negative and above one (in absolute value) in reces-
sions but not in expansions.The size and the sign of multipliers for most of the
macroeconomic indicators above considered are also found to be state-dependent.
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Chapter 1
Economic policy uncertainty in the
US: Does it matter for the Euro
Area?
Abstract
We investigate the effects of a US economic policy uncertainty shock on some Euro
area macroeconomic aggregates via Structural VARs. We model the indicators of
economic policy uncertainty recently developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013)
jointly with the aggregate price indexes and alternative indicators of the business
cycle for the two above indicated economic areas. According to our SVARs, a one
standard deviation shock to US economic policy uncertainty leads to a statisti-
cally significant fall in the European industrial production and prices of −0.12%
and −0.06%, respectively. The contribution of the US uncertainty shock on the
European aggregates is shown to be quantitatively larger than the one exerted by
an Euro area-specific uncertainty shock.
1
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1.1 Introduction
The attention on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty has been recently
reignited by Bloom (2009)'s highly influential paper. A number of VAR inves-
tigations have been proposed to quantify the impact of uncertainty shocks at a
macroeconomic level, (see e.g., Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2009; Bloom, 2009; Baker,
Bloom, and Davis, 2013; Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny, 2013; Leduc and
Liu, 2013; Nodari, 2014). Such investigations have typically followed a within-
the-US-country approach, i.e., they have focused on the reaction of a set of US
variables to a shock to the level of uncertainty affecting the US economy itself.
While being a somewhat natural approach, shocks hitting a leading economy such
as the United States may very well spillover onto other countries. Investigations
documenting the existence of spillovers include Kim (2001), who quantified the role
of US macroeconomic shocks in triggering business cycles at an international level,
and Favero and Giavazzi (2008) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009), who look
at spillover effects regarding financial markets. As for the literature dealing with
uncertainty shocks, Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012) estimate an open-economy
VAR focusing on the potential impact of the volatility of shocks to US real ac-
tivity on UK. They find that spillovers across these two areas may very well be
important.
This paper asks the following question: Are there spillovers from the US econ-
omy to the Euro area due to economic policy uncertainty shocks?" To answer this
question, we model a VAR including both US and Euro area aggregates. Then,
we identify a US uncertainty shock via the imposition of short-run restrictions,
and focus on the responses of Euro area prices and quantities. The uncertainty
shock is identified by appealing to the economic policy uncertainty indicator re-
cently developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). The answer provided by our
empirical investigation turns out to be positive: a one-standard deviation shock
to US economic policy uncertainty leads in the short-run to a statistically signifi-
cant fall in the European industrial production and prices of −0.12% and −0.06%,
respectively.
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Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the data and the iden-
tification scheme employed in our VAR-approach. Section 3 presents our results.
Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Data definition and VAR specification
We analyze the transmission of structural shock from the US to Euro area within
a two-country Structural Vector Autoregressive model (SVAR). A common repre-
sentation of the SVAR is:
B0yt = B(L)yt−p + εt (1.1)
where B(L) is an autoregressive lag-polynomia, and εt is the vector of structural in-
novations. The vector yt = [CPI
US IPIUS iUS NewsUS HCPIEuro IPIEuro iEuro
NewsEuro]′ includes all the endogenous variables in our model and relies on two
blocks: the first one refers to foreign variables (US), whereas the second one
includes domestic variables (Euro area). Each regional block includes: the con-
sumer price index (CPI for the US and HCPI for the Euro area), as measure of
prices; the industrial production index (IPI), as a proxy for the business cycle;
the short-run interest rate (indicated with i in the vector above), which is the
Federal Funds Rate for the US and the three-month interest rate for the Euro
area, as a proxy for the monetary policy instrument. To account for economic
policy uncertainty in the US and the Euro area, we employ two country-specific
empirical proxies carefully constructed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). The
policy-related economic uncertainty for the US (EPUUS) relies on three com-
ponents: a news-based component quantifying newspaper coverage on economic
policy uncertainty (NewsUS); a measure of the federal tax code provisions; and
a measure of disagreement among forecasters. The Euro area uncertainty index
(EPUEuro) relies on two components: a news-based component (NewsEuro), and
a measure of disagreement among forecasters. Since the overall economic policy
uncertainty indexes rely on different components, we focus on uncertainty indexes
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based on news coverage. The correlation between the EPU indicator and its news-
based component is 0.97 and 0.93 for the US and Euro area, respectively. Hence,
we include in vector yt the news-based components, News
US and NewsEuro, as
proxies for the economic policy uncertainty.1 Figure 1.1 plots the monthly time
series of the overall uncertainty indexes and news components, both for the US
and the Euro area.
We need to recover the structural shocks εt from εt = B0ut, where B0 contains
the contemporaneous relationships between the reduced-form residuals ut and the
structural shocks εt. To identify B0, we employ a standard Cholesky decomposi-
tion imposing a lower triangular matrix. Since we are interested in the effects of an
external policy uncertainty shock (US) on the domestic macroeconomic variables
(Euro area), we impose short-run restriction following a country-based exogenous
approach. Because we are using a Cholesky decomposition, the ordering of the
variables in our vector yt is important. Following Favero and Giavazzi (2008), we
assume that shocks hitting the Euro area exert no contemporaneous effects on the
US variables. Consequently, the US block is ordered before the Euro area block
in our vector. Second, within each country-block, we order uncertainty last. We
do so to purge the uncertainty indicator in our VAR from the contemporane-
ous movements of our macroeconomic indicators (prices, industrial production),
therefore sharpening the identification of uncertainty shocks.
Our data are monthly and span the period 1999M1 to 2008M6. The beginning of
the period is motivated by the creation of the Euro area, whereas the end is chosen
to avoid possible non-linearities due to the intensification of the financial crisis.
All variables are in log-levels, except for the interest rate and the uncertainty
indexes, which are in levels.2 We select the optimal number of lags in the SVAR
model combining an initial lag selection based on information criteria with an
LMF test for no serial correlation in the error terms.3 Our SVAR(3) includes
1Our results are robust to the use of the overall indexes instead of their news components.
2 Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) show that VARs in log-levels provide consistent estimates of
the IRFs even in presence of co-integrating vectors. We do not attempt to model co-integrating
vectors given the small size of our sample.
3 SIC and BIC information criteria suggest a VAR(1), whereas AIC a VAR(2). However, the
results are robust to different lag-length choices.
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equation-specific constants and linear trends. The data have been retrieved from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' database (US industrial production, price
level, and federal funds rate), the European Central Bank's Statistical Warehouse
(industrial production, price level, and the three-month interest rate), and the
Economic Policy Uncertainty website (http://www.policyuncertainty.com/).
1.3 Results
Figure 1.2 depicts the impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation shock
to the US uncertainty index. The responses of US industrial production and con-
sumer price index are statistically significant, and suggest a decline in production
and a deflationary phase after an increase in uncertainty. Both the industrial pro-
duction and prices hit their lowest values after three months, reaching a minimum
around −0.13% and −0.08%. The Federal Reserve reacts fast to the economic
condition by adopting an expansionary monetary policy. As the economy settles
on the recovery path, the interest rate goes back to its steady state. Our results
corroborate those reported in previous contributions on the demand type of ef-
fects triggered by uncertainty shocks in the US economy (Alexopoulos and Cohen,
2009; Bloom, 2009; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2013; Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and
Groshenny, 2013; Leduc and Liu, 2013; Nodari, 2014).
Moving to our research question, our VAR predicts a negative and significant reac-
tion of Euro area price and quantity indicators to an unexpected increase in the US
policy uncertainty. The industrial production and consumer prices drop to −0.12%
and −0.06%, respectively, two months after the shock. Then, they slowly go back
to their pre-shock level. One possible explanation is that increases in uncertainty
lead both households and firms to postpone their consumption and investment
decisions due to a precautionary saving-motive (the former) and an increase of the
option-value of waiting (the latter). The fall in aggregate demand may be respon-
sible for the temporary deflation predicted by our VARs. The monetary policy
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easing associated to a temporary reduction in the nominal interest rate is consis-
tent with an inflation-targeting strategy pursued by the monetary policymakers.4
Notably, our impulse responses suggest that, following an exogenous increase in the
US economic policy uncertainty, the Euro area-related uncertainty also increases.
Obviously, given the high level of contamination involving the US and the Euro
area at commercial and financial levels, policy (in)decisions in the United States
may very well increase the perceived uncertainty surrounding policy moves in Eu-
rope. Admittedly, our VARs do not distinguish between reactions by European
aggregates due to an increase in the US uncertainty per se vs. reactions to an
increase in the endogenous component of the Euro-area related uncertainty. This,
however, does not affect our main message, i.e., US economic policy uncertainty
shocks exert a significant effect on Euro area macroeconomic aggregates.
How important is a US uncertainty shock? Table 1.1 highlights the contribution of
the US and European policy uncertainty shocks in explaining the short-run fluc-
tuation in the European variables. In the short-run, the Euro area variables are
estimated to respond more strongly to US uncertainty shock than to the European
counterpart. At a six month horizon, the US shock explains 4% of the variation
in the European industrial production whereas the European policy uncertainty
accounts for 2%. The change in the European consumer prices and policy rate in
response to a US uncertainty shock is six times larger than under the European
counterpart. Therefore, the US policy shock explains an appreciable share of the
variance of the forecast error of the Euro area variables (above all, the policy rate).
More importantly, such shock appears to be more relevant on European aggregates
than its European counterpart. Table 1 also reports the results obtained by esti-
mating the impact of US uncertainty shocks with the two alternative proxies for
uncertainty that compose the Economic Forecast Disagreement recently proposed
4Our results are robust to: i) ordering the news indexes first in each country-specific block;
ii) different lag-length specifications; iii) the introduction of extra-variables in the VAR (i.e.,
nominal effective exchange rate, Chicago Fed National Activity Index and EuroCoin business
cycle indicator, University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index); iv) the employment of
alternative uncertainty indexes (EPUUS/EPUEuro and V IX/V STOXX); v) the inclusion of
the financial crisis period in our sample. The robustness checks are available upon request.
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by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013): the Government Spending Disagreement Fore-
cast, and the CPI Disagreement Forecasts (CPIDF).5 The GSDF proxy confirms
the relatively larger role played by US uncertainty shocks on European variables
as for industrial production and the policy rate. The CPIDF measure of uncer-
tainty plays a milder role for both US and European uncertainty shocks, therefore
suggesting that different measures of uncertainty may very well depict different
contributions as for the macroeconomic dynamics of the Euro area. Finally, Ta-
ble 1 (see Sample with Financial Crisis observations, line SFC) documents the
reduction of the relevance of US uncertainty shocks (in the context of our baseline
model), possibly due to the increased variability in the policy uncertainty index.
1.4 Robustness checks
Our results show that an expected increase in the US economic policy uncertainty
has negative and statistically significant effects on the Euro Area macroeconomic
aggregates. In this section, a number of robustness checks are considered.
Contemporaneous effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. We
identify the economic policy uncertainty shocks ordering last the uncertainty in-
dicators in each country-block. This specification allows us to purge the uncer-
tainty index by others US shocks that simultaneously may hit the US variables.
However, such specification imposes on impact a zero-reaction of US macroeco-
nomic aggregates to an increase in the US economic uncertainty. To check the
extent to which our Cholesky identification assumption may affect the results,6 we
estimate an alternative specification in which the policy uncertainty indicators are
ordered first in each country-block. This specification implies that the US policy
uncertainty shock is predetermined with respect to the other US macroeconomic
5The US government spending disagreement forecast refers to the federal, state, and local
purchases for the US, whereas the European one only concerns to the federal budget balances.
6In our model the innovation is orthogonized using the Cholesky decomposition of the covari-
ance matrix, then it may be sensitive to the ordering of the variables. Choosing a different order
of the variables produce different shocks and the impact of the shock on the system may depend
on the way the variables are setting in vector yt. To tackle this problem Sims (1980) suggested
checking the robustness of the results to the ordering of the variables.
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variables. Figure 1.3 displays the results. While in our baseline specification the
US uncertainty shock acts like a demand shock on the US macroeconomic vari-
ables, such result is reversed when the uncertainty indicator is ordered first. These
mixed results for the US economy are in line with the doubts arising from the re-
cent economic literature about uncertainty. Indeed, Leduc and Liu (2013) find
that a uncertainty shock acts as demand shock in the US. Conversely, Mumtaz
and Theodoridis (2012), studying the spillover effect due to a volatility shock in an
open economy, find that such shock acts as a supply shock. Turning to the Euro
Area, this alternative specification confirms our main results. An increase in the
US economic policy uncertainty has negative and statistically significant effects on
the Euro Area.
Additional information. One potential concern with our baseline specification
is that vector yt does not embed sufficient information. If the SVAR is misspec-
ified, then the IRFs may be distorted. To address this concern, we (re)estimate
our SVAR including additional macroeconomic variables. To incorporate interna-
tional linkages between the US and the Euro Area, we add to the vector yt the
nominal effective exchange rate of dollar to one unit of euro (henceforth, NEER).
An increase in the exchange rate translates in a depreciation of the dollar. Figure
1.4 plots the results when we order the NEER last in vector yt, as in Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995). To control for some exchange rate dynamics that may affect
the US economic policy uncertainty shock, we also estimate a SVAR in which the
NEER is ordered first. Figure 1.5 depicts the findings. Overall, our main results
are robust in these exercises.
The economic policy changes may be correlated not only to the dynamic of infla-
tion, output and interest rate (included in our baseline specification), but also to
other several macroeconomic variables. To tackle this issue, we add to our base-
line model two business cycle indicators: the Chicago Fed National Activity Index
(CFNAI) and the EuroCoin, for the US economy and the Euro area one respec-
tively. Then, we estimate a FAVAR model (Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005)
placing the business cycle indicators instead of the industrial production indices.
This because the policymakers' actions may be correlated to a wider measure of
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real activity (Kilian, 2011) than the industrial production index. Ordering first the
business factors indicators in vector yt, we purge the US uncertainty shock from
other macroeconomic effects. Moreover, since the business indicators capture also
the prospective economic conditions, we "purge" the economic policy uncertainty
shock from policymakers' actions depending on economic conditions in the short-
run. Our robustness check is reported in figure 1.6. The findings confirm that a
US economic policy uncertainty acts as an aggregate demand shock in the Euro
area.
To further investigate the accuracy of the impulse responses, we purge our proxy
of economic policy uncertainty from the agents' expectations that may be related
to some factors relating to the future state of economy. To control for expectation,
we re-estimate our baseline model adding an index of consumer expectations based
on information collected via the Michigan Survey. The Consumer Expectations
Index captures how changes in economic conditions affect people and the agent's
expectation about future levels of economic activity. The correlation between the
US economic policy uncertainty and the Consumer expectations index is -0.34. In
this way we check whether our main results depend on the fact that the economic
policy uncertainty reflects the consumer confidence. Figure 1.7 shows the results.
This exercise confirms our main results.
Alternative identifications of uncertainty shocks. In our baseline specifi-
cation, the uncertainty shocks are identified by the "news" components of the
economic policy uncertainty index proposed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013).
To check the sensitivity of our results to the identification of the uncertainty struc-
tural shock, we re-estimate our baseline. We substitute our measure of US and
Euro area policy uncertainty, NewsUS and NewsEuro, with the overall economic
policy uncertainty indexes, EPUUS and EPUEuro index. Figure 1.8 displays the
results. Our main results are robust to this alternative specification.
A proxy for uncertainty widely used in the literature (Bloom, 2009; Baker, Bloom,
and Davis, 2013; Leduc and Liu, 2013) is the VIX index. It captures expected
volatility of S&P500 index option price on the next 30 days period. Figure 1.9
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shows the results, when our US and Euro Area economic policy uncertainty indexes
are replaced by the VIX and VSTOXX indexes, respectively. The transmission
mechanism of such financial shock on the US industrial production turns out to be
different from the economic policy uncertainty one. Indeed, there is no significant
reaction of the US industrial production to a financial uncertainty. Notice that the
correlation between the US economic policy uncertainty index and the VIX is 0.66.
Thus, this finding can be explained by the fact that the news component may be
correlated to other variables which have not been captured by the VIX index. It
means, as in Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009), that the Wall Street concerning may
be in some way different from the Main Street ones. Turning to the Euro Area, the
response of the European industrial production and inflation to a financial shock
is statistically significant and negative. This exercise confirms our main results on
the Euro area.
Alternative lag specification. We select the optimal number of lags in the
SVAR model combining an initial lag selection based on information criteria with
an LMF test for no serial correlation in the error terms. We estimate a SVAR(3).
However, the lag specification matters for the accuracy of the impulse response
functions.7 To address this concern, we (re)estimate a SVAR(5). Figure 1.10
displays the results. Except the jaggedness of variable responses the pattern of
the variables are in line with those of our baseline model estimated combining the
parsimonious result of information criteria and LMF test.
Our results holds to alternative lag specification, measures of uncertainty, ordering,
and additional macroeconomic variables.
1.5 Conclusions
We investigate to what extent US economic policy uncertainty shock may trigger
reactions at a macroeconomic level in the Euro area. Our VARs find a negative
7A large lag length relating to the number of observations may cause inefficient estimates
of the parameters. Conversely, a too short lag length may arise a spurious significance of the
parameter (Bjørnlan, 2000).
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and significant reaction of Euro area price and quantity indicators to such shock.
We find the contribution of exogenous variations of the US uncertainty indicator
to be larger than that induced by its European counterpart.
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Figure 1.1: Plots of time series of EPU and news policy uncertainty indexes
for US and Euro (1999M1-2008M6).
Notes: Fugures plot the monthly time series of the overall uncertainty indexes and news compo-
nents, both for the US (on the left) and the Euro area (on the right).
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Figure 1.2: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Policy Uncertainty
Shock
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US
and European variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded ar-
eas identify the bootstrap-after-bootstrap Kilian (1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000
replications). The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the
other variables are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The hori-
zontal axis identifies months.
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Table 1.1: Forecast error variance decomposition of the European variables
due to US and European economic policy uncertainty shock (percentage)
Horizon Consumer Prices Industrial Production Policy rate
(in months) NewsUS NewsEuro NewsUS NewsEuro NewsUS NewsEuro
1 2 0 0 0 7 0
6 7 1 4 2 18 3
12 6 1 3 2 11 2
18 6 1 2 2 7 2
24 6 1 2 2 6 2
6 (GSDF) 0 2 8 1 4 0
6 (CPIDF) 2 2 2 0 1 1
6 (SFC) 1 3 3 3 2 2
Notes: GSDF: Government Spending Disagreement Forecasts, CPIDF: CPI Disagreement Fore-
casts, SFC: Sample with Financial Crisis.
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Figure 1.3: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(trying a different ordering)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We order the policy uncertainty indexes first in each country-block. We
estimate the following vector yt = [News
US CPIUS IPIUS iUS NewsEuro HCPIEuro IPIEuro
iEuro]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and European
variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas identify the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000 replications).
The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the other variables
are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The horizontal axis
identifies months.
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Figure 1.4: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(with the Nominal exchange rate ordered last)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We add to our baseline model the Nominal effective exchange rate (US-
D/EUR). We estimate yt = [CPI
US IPIUS iUS NewsUS HCPIEuro IPIEuro iEuro NewsEuro
Exchange rate]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and Euro-
pean variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas identify
the bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000 replica-
tions). The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the other
variables are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The horizontal
axis identifies months.
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Figure 1.5: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(with the Nominal exchange rate ordered first)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We add to our baseline model the Nominal effective exchange rate (US-
D/EUR). We estimate yt = [Exchange rate CPI
US IPIUS iUS NewsUS HCPIEuro IPIEuro
iEuro NewsEuro]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and
European variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas
identify the bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000
replications). The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the
other variables are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The hori-
zontal axis identifies months.
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Figure 1.6: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(with Business cycle indicators)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We set two principal component indexes of real activity, the CFNAI
and the EuroCoin business cycle (source: Datastream), instead of the US and Euro area industrial
production. We estimate the following vector yt = [CPI
US CFNAI iUS NewsUS HCPIEuro
EuroCoin iEuro NewsEuro]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US
and European variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas
identify the bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000
replications). The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the
other variables are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The
horizontal axis identifies months.
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Figure 1.7: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(with the US consumer confidence)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic pol-
icy uncertainty shock. We add to our baseline model the University of Michigan Consumer Sen-
timent Index. We estimate yt = [Cons. Conf CPI
US IPIUS iUS NewsUS HCPIEuro IPIEuro
iEuro NewsEuro]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and
European variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas
identify the bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000
replications). The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the
other variables are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The hori-
zontal axis identifies months.
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Figure 1.8: Empirical Impulse Responses to an Uncertainty Shock (substitut-
ing the economic policy uncertainty indexes)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We set the EPUUS and the EPUEuro instead of the US and Euro area
news component and we estimate yt = [CPI
US IPIUS iUS EPUUS HCPIEuro IPIEuro iEuro
EPUEuro]′. The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and European
variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas identify the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000 replications).
The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the other variables
are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The horizontal axis
identifies months.
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Figure 1.9: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty Shock
(substituting the economic policy uncertainty indexes)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We set the VIX (Leduc and Liu, 2013; Bloom et al., 2013) and the VS-
TOXX instead of the US and European policy uncertainty index, respectively. We estimate the
following vector yt = [CPI
US IPIUS iUS V IX HCPIEuro IPIEuro iEuro V STOXX]′. The
columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and European variables, respec-
tively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas identify the bootstrap-after-
bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000 replications). The economic
policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the other variables are expressed
in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The horizontal axis identifies months.
Economic policy uncertainty in the US: Does it matter for the Euro Area? 22
Figure 1.10: Empirical Impulse Responses to a US Economic Uncertainty
Shock (with a different lag specification)
Notes: The figure reports orthogonalized impulse responses to an unanticipated US economic
policy uncertainty shock. We estimate our baseline model with a different lag specification, a
SVAR(5). The columns on the left and on the right report the IRFs for the US and European
variables, respectively. The solid lines denote the median IRFs. The shaded areas identify the
bootstrap-after-bootstrap (Kilian, 1998) confidence intervals at 90% level (2,000 replications).
The economic policy uncertainty indexes are expressed in levels, whereas all the other variables
are expressed in percent deviations with respect to their steady state. The horizontal axis
identifies months.
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Chapter 2
Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News
From a Nonlinear World
Abstract
We estimate nonlinear VARs to assess to what extent fiscal spending multipli-
ers are countercyclical in the United States. We deal with the issue of non-
fundamentalness due to fiscal foresight by appealing to sums of revisions of expec-
tations of fiscal expenditures. This measure of anticipated fiscal shocks is shown
to carry valuable information about future dynamics of public spending. Results
based on generalized impulse responses suggest that fiscal spending multipliers in
recessions are greater than one, but not statistically larger than those in expan-
sions. However, nonlinearities arise when focusing on "extreme" events, i.e., deep
recessions vs. strong expansionary periods.
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2.1 Introduction
How large is the fiscal spending multiplier? Following the lead of Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), several VAR models featuring fiscal aggregates have been esti-
mated to answer this question (for a survey, see Ramey, 2011a). However, the
quantification of fiscal multipliers with standard VARs is controversial for two
reasons. First, as stressed by Parker (2011), the effects of fiscal policy shocks
may very well be countercyclical. Fiscal multipliers may be larger in periods
of slack because of a milder crowding out of private consumption and invest-
ment due to less responsive prices (see the textbook IS-LM-AD-AS model), a con-
strained reaction of nominal interest rates due to the zero-lower bound (Eggerts-
son, 2010; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011; Woodford, 2011; Leeper,
Traum, and Walker, 2011; Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramírez, 2012), higher returns from public spending due to countercyclical
financial frictions and credit constraints (Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba,
2011), and lower crowding out of private employment due to a milder increase
in labor market tightness (Michaillat, 2014; Roulleau-Pasdeloup, 2014). Empiri-
cal evidence in favor of state-dependent fiscal multipliers is provided by, among
others, Tagkalakis (2008), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a, 2013b),
Bachmann and Sims (2012), Batini, Callegari, and Melina (2012), Mittnik and
Semmler (2012), Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012), Fazzari, Morley,
and Panovska (2014).1 Second, anticipation effects are likely to be of great rel-
evance in the transmission of fiscal policy shocks, a phenomenon often referred
to as "fiscal foresight" (see, among others, Yang, 2005; Fisher and Peters, 2010;
Mertens and Ravn, 2011; Ramey, 2011b; Gambetti, 2012a; Gambetti, 2012b; Kri-
woluzky, 2012; Favero and Giavazzi, 2012; Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2013; Ellahie
and Ricco, 2013). Modeling a standard set of U.S. variables with a medium-scale
1Other forms of state-dependence have been identified in the literature. Corsetti, Meier,
and Müller (2012) investigate the sensitivity of government spending multipliers to different
economic scenarios. They find fiscal multipliers to be particularly high during times of financial
crisis. Rossi and Zubairy (2011) and Canova and Pappa (2011) show that fiscal multipliers tend
to be larger when positive spending shocks are accompanied by a decline in the real interest rate.
Perotti (1999) shows that fiscal multipliers may depend on the debt-to-GDP ratio in place when
fiscal shocks occur. For a DSGE-based quantification of fiscal multipliers in presence of normal
vs. abnormal debt-to-GDP ratios, see Cantore, Levine, Melina, and Pearlman (2013).
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structural model that allows for foresight up to eight quarters, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012) find that about sixty percent of the variance of government spend-
ing is due to anticipated shocks. Unfortunately, in presence of fiscal foresight,
standard VARs - which rely on current and past shocks to interpret the dynamics
of the modeled variables - are typically "non-fundamental", in that they do not
embed the information related to "news shocks", i.e., future shocks anticipated by
rational agents.2 Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013) work with a variety of fiscal
models and show that the anticipation of tax policy shocks severely affects VAR
exercises aiming at identifying fiscal shocks. Forni and Gambetti (2010a) and
Ramey (2011b) show that government spending shocks estimated with standard
fiscal VARs are predictable, i.e., they are non-fundamental.
This paper estimates state-dependent fiscal multipliers by explicitly addressing
the issue of fiscal foresight. We tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness by jointly
modeling a measure of anticipated ("news") fiscal spending shocks along with a
set of standard macro-fiscal variables. Such a measure of fiscal news is the sum of
revisions of expectations about future government spending collected by the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters. As shown by Gambetti (2012a, 2012b) and Forni
and Gambetti (2014a), this measure of fiscal shocks is particularly powerful to
capture the effects of fiscal spending shocks when the implementation lag of fiscal
policy is larger than one quarter, a very plausible assumption as for U.S. fiscal
policy decisions.3 We include this measure of fiscal news in a nonlinear Smooth
Transition Vector AutoRegressive (STVAR) model, which we use to discriminate
dynamic responses to fiscal shocks in bad and good times (i.e., recessions vs. ex-
pansions). Our multipliers are computed as the integral of the impulse response
of output (up to a chosen horizon) divided by the integral of the response of fiscal
expenditure (up to the same horizon) and rescaled by the sample mean value of
2For a recent discussion on non-fundamentalness in the VAR context and a survey of the
main contributions in this area, see Beaudry and Portier (2014).
3Yang (2005) shows that the average implementation lag for major postwar U.S. income tax
legislation is about seven months. Mertens and Ravn (2011) find that the median implementation
lag is six quarters. Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012) calibrate tax foresight and government
spending foresight to range between two and eight quarters (the former) and between three and
four quarters (the latter).
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the output-public spending ratio.4 To assess the effects of public spending shocks
on output and estimate fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions, we compute
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), which model the endogeneity
of the transition from a state to another after a fiscal shock. Importantly, as ex-
plained by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), GIRFs allow us to scrutinize the
role played by different initial conditions. We then isolate "extreme" events, i.e.,
deep recessions and strong expansions, with the aim of understanding if fiscal mul-
tipliers are larger in very severe economic conditions. To our knowledge, this key
policy-relevant question has not been previously studied in the empirical literature
on fiscal multipliers.
Our results are the following: i) anticipated fiscal expenditure shocks trigger a
significant reaction of output; ii) such a reaction is not statistically different across
different phases (recessions/expansions) of the U.S. business cycle; iii) the reaction
becomes statistically different for extreme phases of the business cycle, i.e., deep
recessions vs. strong expansions; iv) fiscal multipliers in recessions are statistically
larger than one; v) spending shocks in recessions have a noticeable stabilization
effect and substantially reduce the probability that the economy will remain slack.
These results are robust to a wide battery of checks, including i) the employment of
a "purged" measure of fiscal news, which is constructed using information available
to survey respondents when they formulate their expectations over future public
spending, to account for potential identification issues; ii) the use of the fiscal
news constructed by Ramey (2011b), which allows us to extend our sample back
to 1947, to control for small-sample biases that may affect our data-intensive
estimator; iii) the role of debt, to account for the role played by fiscal strains in
computing multipliers; iv) several different VAR specifications.
Our paper represents a novel contribution under several respects. First, our VAR
4Our results are robust to the employment of an alternative way of computing fiscal multi-
pliers, i.e., the ratio of the "peak" value of the impulse responses of output and public spending
rescaled by the sample mean ratio of the levels of ouput over public spending. Our Appendix
(available upon request) documents the results obtained with this alternative way of computing
fiscal multipliers.
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jointly accounts for two relevant issues for the quantification of fiscal multipli-
ers: fiscal foresight and state dependence. Second, we estimate the response of
economic aggregates to fiscal shocks via GIRFs, which allow us to endogenize
the possibly stabilizing effects of fiscal policy. Third, the use of GIRFs allows us
to address a previously unexplored issue, i.e., the role played by business cycle
conditions for the quantification of fiscal multipliers, which we investigate by dis-
tinguishing between "extreme" and "moderate" business cycle phases. As a result,
we are able to establish some new stylized facts about government spending mul-
tipliers in the U.S., in particular the fact that firm evidence of state dependence
arises only when looking at extreme phases of the business cycle.
The closest papers to ours are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), Owyang,
Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a) employ a STVAR model and find evidence of coun-
tercyclical fiscal multipliers.5 There are substantial differences between Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko's contributions and ours. First, they investigate the role of
unanticipated fiscal spending shocks. Differently, we focus on anticipated changes
in fiscal spending. Second, their impulse responses are conditionally linear, i.e.,
expansionary fiscal spending shocks are, by construction, not allowed to drive the
economy out of a recession. As pointed out by the same authors, this assumption
provides an "upper bound" for their estimates of the fiscal multiplier in recessions,
because it does not allow the returns from fiscal spending to be decreasing as the
economy exits a recession. Our approach links the evolution of the variables in
our STVAR to the probability of being in a recession, which is then endogenously
modeled. Third, our focus is on "extreme" events, i.e., realizations on the tails
of the distribution of our business cycle indicator (like the 2007-09 crisis). Our
main result is that, while fiscal multipliers may be acyclical when recessions and
expansions are considered all alike (i.e., they may be similar when considering the
average effect in recessions vs. expansions), they are likely to be large in presence
of particularly severe economic conditions. Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013)
and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) employ local-projection methods á la Jordá (2005)
5For a similar exercise focusing on the role of business confidence, see Bachmann and Sims
(2012).
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to investigate the nonlinearity of fiscal multipliers. They find no evidence of larger
fiscal multipliers during downturns as for the United States. The comparability
between our exercises and theirs is not immediate due to a number of different
modeling choices (construction of the news shocks, length of the sample, con-
struction of the impulse responses, among others). We notice that our results are
similar to theirs in that we also do not find larger fiscal multipliers in recessions
on average. However, when it comes to deep recessions vs. strong expansions, we
find such larger multipliers to arise.
Other strands of the literature have dealt with fiscal foresight and anticipated fiscal
spending shocks in VARs. Mertens and Ravn (2010) recover the non-fundamental
responses to an anticipated fiscal policy shock via economic theory-driven restric-
tions to gauge information about economic agents' anticipation rate. Such a rate
is then used as an input in Blaschke matrices to flip the roots that cause the non-
invertibility of the VMA representation of fiscal spending and output. Kriwoluzky
(2012) recovers reduced-form innovations by estimating a VARMA model using
the Kalman filter. Then, he identifies anticipated fiscal shocks via theoretically-
supported sign restrictions. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) follow a narrative approach
to identify exogenous changes in military spending related to wars. Ramey (2011b)
constructs a measure of changes in the expected present value of government spend-
ing. Fisher and Peters (2010) construct a measure of excess returns of large U.S.
military contractors which is shown to anticipate future military spending shocks.
Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) identify U.S. defense news shocks as the shocks that
best explain future movements in defense spending over a five year horizon and
are orthogonal to current defense spending. All these contributions show that, at
least qualitatively, anticipated positive fiscal shocks induce a significant increase
in output.6 Perotti (2007, 2011), Ramey (2011b), Gambetti (2012a, 2012b), Blan-
chard and Leigh (2013), Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2014), Forni and Gambetti
6 Another interesting approach to account for fiscal foresight rests on the use of municipal
bond spreads. This bond spread is well-known to have predictive power for tax changes and
can therefore be used to control for anticipated tax changes (see, among others, Poterba (1989),
Fortune (1996), and Kueng (2014)). Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012) show that spreads with
maturity lengths of 1 and 5 years are very informative about future tax events. Our paper deals
with anticipated fiscal spending shocks. We leave the analysis of anticipated tax shocks to future
research.
Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News From a Nonlinear World 31
(2014a), and Ricco (2014) work with expectations revisions in different modeling
frameworks. Our paper complements these contributions, in that it quantifies the
effects of anticipated fiscal spending shocks with a nonlinear model focusing on
extreme events.7
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 deals with the issue of non-
fundamentalness in the macro-fiscal context due to the presence of fiscal foresight,
and explains why the sums of revisions of fiscal expectations variable employed
in our analysis helps solving the issue. Section 3 offers statistical support to the
role of nonlinearities in this context and presents the Smooth Transition VAR
model employed in our analysis. Our main results are shown in Section 4, which
deals with the computation of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions, and
Section 5, which focuses on extreme events. Section 6 documents a battery of
robustness checks. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
2.2 Non-fundamentalness and expectations revi-
sions
The role of expectations revisions. As anticipated in our Introduction, stan-
dard fiscal VARs may return severely biased impulse responses in presence of news
shocks. Consider the model
yt = δEtyt+1 + gt + ωt (2.1)
gt = εt−h + φ1εt−h−1 + . . .+ φq−h−1εt−(q−1) + φq−hεt−q = Φ(L)εt (2.2)
7Admittedly, the theoretical papers modeling nonlinearities cited in this Introduction mainly
consider models in which government spending is implemented without lags. As for the zero
lower bound, however, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) conduct an exercise in which
they model implementation lags in their framework featuring the zero lower bound. They find
that a key determinant of the size of the multiplier is indeed the state of the world in which
new government spending comes on line. Our conjecture is that such asymmetric effects may be
present also when anticipated fiscal shocks hit economic systems characterized by state-dependent
financial constraints and labor market downward rigidities.
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where |δ| < 1, φi > 0 ∀i, h ≥ 0, q ≥ h, and φ0 = 0. The forward-looking process
yt - say, output measured as log-deviations from its trend - is affected by the
exogenous stationary process gt - say, a fiscal shock - plus a random shock ωt,
which is assumed to capture non-fiscal spending shocks affecting output and which
is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance. The process (2.2) features
q − h + 1 moving average terms. If h = 0 and q > 0, the process (2.2) features
an unanticipated, εt, as well as anticipated shocks εt−q for q > 0. For h > 0,
the process (2.2) would feature only unanticipated shocks, where h is the number
of periods of foresights. The process gt is a news-rich process if |φi| > 1 for at
least one i > 0 (Beaudry and Portier, 2014). In all cases, {εt−j}qj=h is said to be
fundamental for gt if the roots of the polynomial Φ(L) lie outside the unit circle
(Hansen and Sargent, 1991). Importantly, if the gt process is non-fundamental, its
structural shock is not recoverable by employing current and past realizations of
gt only. Consequently, its impulse response to an anticipated shock as well as the
dynamic responses of other variables  in this example, yt  will not be correctly
recovered by estimating a VAR in yt and gt.
We assume that agents have rational expectations and observe news shocks with-
out noise.8 It can be shown that, if the period of foresight h > 1 is known, the
problem of non-fundamentalness in model (2.1)-(2.2) can be solved by alternatively
including: i) the h-step-ahead expectation, Etgt+h, if h = q; ii) the h-step-ahead
expectation revision, Etgt+h−Et−1gt+h, if h < q. However, if h > 1 is unknown, ex-
pectation revisions are not of help. To solve this issue, Gambetti (2012a) proposes
to use a news variable defined as
8 Forni, Gambetti, Lippi, and Sala (2013) investigate the case in which economic agents deal
with noisy news. Agents are assumed to receive signals regarding the future realization of TFP
shocks. Since such signals are noisy, agents react not only to genuinely informative news, but
also to noise shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals. They find that such noise
shocks explain about a third of the variance of output, consumption, and investment. We leave
the quantification of the role of noise shocks in the fiscal context to future research.
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ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) =
 (1 + φ1 + ...+ φJ−h) εt if J < q(1 + φ1 + ...+ φq−h) εt if J > q , (2.3)
which correctly identifies the news shock if J > h.9 Our Appendix provides further
discussions and derivations as regards this news variable.
The News13 variable. We will then consider a fiscal VAR augmented with a
measure of news constructed by summing up revisions of expectations as follows:
ηg13 =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) (2.4)
where Etgt+j is the forecast of the growth rate of real government spending from
period t+j−1 to period t+j based on the information available at time t. Hence,
Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j represents the "news" that becomes available to private agents
between time t− 1 and t about the growth rate of government spending j periods
ahead. We use data coming from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
which collects forecasts conditional on time t − 1 of variables up to time t + 3.
This is the reason why our baseline analysis will be conducted by considering the
variable ηg13.
10
Information content of expectations revisions. To assess the statistical rele-
vance of our news variable for the dynamics of public expenditure, we regress public
spending on a constant and three lags of the dependent variable, public receipts,
real GDP, and one lag of the measure of news ηg13 (a detailed description of the
9If J < h, the news variable would have no predictive content about fiscal shocks, and would
be equal to zero. In our sample, however, this never happens. This is consistent with the evidence
in Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012), who report an average implementation lag of about three
quarters. In our example above, h should be interpreted as the minimum temporal gap between
the announcement of the implementation of future fiscal spending and the realization of the
spending itself (which may take more than one quarter), rather than the mean value. Hence,
also the effects of the announcement of future spending whose full implementation would take
more than J quarters would be captured by our news, as long as the minimum lag h is less than
J .
10SPF data are affected by frequent changes in the base years. Forecast errors on the growth
rates are not affected by these changes. Hence, they are preferable to forecast errors computed
with SPF levels. About this point, see also Perotti (2011).
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data is provided in Section 3). This regression augments the public spending equa-
tion of a trivariate VAR system modeling the "usual suspects" (public spending,
tax receipts, output) with our news variable lagged one period.11 Public spending
shocks are often identified with a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix
of the VAR residuals. Hence, the (orthogonalized) residuals of the public spend-
ing equation are interpreted as public spending shocks. As shown in Table 2.1 -
which collects the p-values for our ηg13 variable in the equation described above -
news shocks are found to carry significant information about the future evolution
of public spending. This implies that the trivariate fiscal VAR without news is
non-fundamental. Digging deeper, we find that all the three components (fore-
cast revisions) included in ηg13 have some predictive power. Overall, this empirical
exercise highlights the significant contribution of news revisions regarding future
realizations of public expenditure. Differently, revisions of expectations based on
nowcasting, i.e., Etgt − Et−1gt, turn out to be insignificant at the 90% confidence
level (see Table 1, last column). In line with Ricco (2014), this result suggests that
revisions based on "nowcasts" (revision of expectations at time t of contempora-
neous public expenditures) are possibly of help in identifying truly unanticipated
fiscal shocks, rather than anticipated, news shocks.12
Overall, our results i) show that, from a statistical standpoint, residuals typically
employed in a standard trivariate fiscal VAR cannot be interpreted as fiscal shocks;
ii) suggest that the components of the variable ηg13, which we interpret as a measure
of anticipated fiscal shocks, can augment the information content of our VAR
system. These results are consistent with the outcome of the Granger-causality
tests conducted by Gambetti (2012b), who shows that ηg13 Granger-causes fiscal
spending at different horizons.13
11The regression includes variables in (log-)levels and the news ηg13 variable in cumulated sums
to preserve the same order of integration. This is consistent with the modeling choices of our
baseline VAR analysis (specified in the next Section).
12These results are conditional on news variables constructed as revisions of the mean predicted
values of the levels of future government spending as collected by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Similar results were obtained by employing median values of such forecasts, as well
as variables expressed in growth rates.
13In a recent paper, Perotti (2011) questions the use of the SPF forecast errors employed
by Ramey (2011a) to isolate fiscal spending anticipated shocks. In particular, he shows that
the one-step-ahead predictive power of the forecast revisions as for federal spending is quite
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Extreme realizations of the news spending variable: An interpretation.
Figure 2.1 plots our news variable (an updated version of Gambetti, 2012b). The
standardized variable ηg13 conveys useful information about fiscal policy shocks in
the United States. To see this, we isolate the seven realizations which exceed two
in absolute value, and provide an interpretation based on the recent U.S. fiscal
history. The 1983Q1 positive realization is associated to Ronald Reagan's "Evil
Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches, with which the U.S. President announced a
forthcoming increase in military spending. The 1986Q1 negative spike reflects the
speech given in January 1986 by Mikhail Gorbachev, who proposed decommission-
ing all nuclear weapons by 2000 in the early stage of the "Perestrojka" period. The
1987Q1 positive forecast revisions might be due to the mid-term Senate elections
won by the Democrats in November 1986 plus the questioned constitutionality
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced-Budget Act. The 1987Q4 forecast revi-
sions are due to announcements about spending cuts for the Pentagon. The fall
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 is behind the negative spike in 1989Q4. The
war in Afghanistan rationalizes the positive peak in 2001Q4. Finally, the upward
spike in 2009Q1 can be associated to Obama's stimulus package.
Comparison with Ramey's (2011b) news variable. Figure 2.1 also plots the
military spending news variable constructed by Ramey (2011b), and extended up
to 2010Q4 by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).14 It appears that the ηg13 vari-
able anticipates changes in Ramey's, or at least it is not anticipated by the latter.
To corroborate this statement, we run Granger-causality tests based on an esti-
mated bivariate VAR with one lag involving the military spending news proposed
by Ramey (2011b) (as well as its updated version by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy,
2013) and the ηg13 variable. Table 2.2 collects the outcome (p-values associated to
testing the null hypothesis that the column variable does not Granger-cause the
modest, since such revisions are shown to be noisy. Our results are fully consistent with Perotti
(2011) analysis, in that we also reject the relevance of very short-term SPF forecast revisions
on future fiscal spending. This evidence suggests the need of searching for anticipation effects
beyond one-quarter relative to the moment in which predictions are formulated, and supports
the employment of a variable like ηg13.
14Ramey (2011b) employs Business Week and other newspaper sources to construct an esti-
mate of changes in the expected present value of goverment spending (nominal spending divided
by nominal GDP one period before).
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alternative news measure) of this exercise for our benchmark sample and a shorter
sample to account for the fact that, for the first five years in the benchmark sample,
Ramey (2011b) variable is equal to zero. While the contribution of our news shock
variable finds large statistical support, Granger-causality running from Ramey's
shock to ours is clearly rejected by the data. The same evidence emerges when
employing the news variable by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), which in-
cludes observations related to the 2007-2009 recession. Again, these results are in
line with those reported in Gambetti (2012b), who also finds Ramey's news shock
to be predicted by forecast revisions over one quarter.
2.3 Econometric approach: A STVARmacro-fiscal
model
Modeling choices. We assess the state-dependence of fiscal spending multipliers
to news shocks by estimating a Smooth-Transition VAR model (for an extensive
presentation, see Terësvirta, Tjostheim, and Granger, 2010). Our STVAR frame-
work reads as follows:
X t = F (zt−1)ΠR(L)X t + (1− F (zt−1))ΠE(L)X t + εt, (2.5)
εt ∼ N(0,Ωt), (2.6)
Ωt = F (zt−1)ΩR + (1− F (zt−1))ΩE, (2.7)
F (zt) = exp(−γzt)/(1 + exp(−γzt)), γ > 0, zt ∼ N(0, 1). (2.8)
where X t is a set of endogenous variables which we aim to model, F (zt−1) is a
transition function which captures the probability of being in a recession, γ regu-
lates the smoothness of the transition between states, zt is a transition indicator,
ΠR and ΠE are the VAR coefficients capturing the dynamics of the system during
recessions and expansions (respectively), εt is the vector of reduced-form residuals
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having zero-mean and whose time-varying, state-contingent variance-covariance
matrix is Ωt, and ΩR and ΩE stand for the covariance structure of the residuals
in recessions and expansions, respectively. The modeling assumption is that the
variables can be described with a combination of two linear VARs, one suited to
describe the economy during recessions and the other during expansions. The
transition from a state to another is regulated by the standardized transition vari-
able zt. The smoothness parameter γ affects the probability of being in a recession
F (zt), i.e., the larger the value of γ, the faster the transition from a state to an-
other. Notably, the model (2.5)-(2.8) allows for nonlinearities to arise from both
the contemporaneous and the dynamic relationships of the economic system. Our
baseline analysis refers to the vector X t = [Gt, Tt, Yt, η
g
13,t]
′, where G is the log
of real government (federal, state, and local) purchases (consumption and invest-
ment), T is the log of real government receipts of direct and indirect taxes net of
transfers to business and individuals, and Y is the log of real GDP.15 The con-
struction of G and T closely follows Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013).16 The
variable ηg13 is the public expenditure news variable (2.4). The variables are ex-
pressed in levels because of possible cointegration relationships. Consistently, the
variable ηg13 is considered in cumulated sums to preserve the same order of integra-
tion as the other variables included in the vector. Our sample of U.S. data spans
the period 1981Q3-2013Q1, 1981Q3 being the first available quarter to construct
the news variable.17
The choice of the transition variable zt and the calibration of the smoothing pa-
rameter γ are justified as follows. As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012),
15Our fiscal aggregates are constructed using the Bureau of Economic Analysis' NIPA Table
3.1. Current tax receipts are constructed as the difference between current receipts and gov-
ernment social benefits. Fiscal expenditure is the sum of consumption expenditure and gross
government investment from which we subtract the consumption of fixed capital. Data on real
GDP and the implicit GDP deflator (which we use to deflate all nominal series) are provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
16Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) check and verify the robustness of the results in Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012) to the employment of a different definition of the net tax series
that avoids the double-counting of mandatory Social Security contributions.
17Our interpretation of the news variable here is that of an instrument to gauge the real effects
of anticipated changes in fiscal spending. We recall that different identification approaches may
very well lead to the construction of different, but in principle equally valid, instruments. For
an elaboration of this point, see Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
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Bachmann and Sims (2012), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Groshenny (2014), and
Berger and Vavra (2014), we employ a standardized moving average of the real
GDP quarter-on-quarter percentage growth rate.18 We calibrate the smoothness
parameter γ to match the observed frequencies of the U.S. recessions as iden-
tified by the NBER business cycle dates, i.e. 15% in our sample. Then, we
define as "recession" a period in which F (zt) > 0.85, and calibrate γ to obtain
Pr(F (zt) > 0.85) ≈ 15%. This metric implies a calibration γ = 2.3. The choice is
consistent with the threshold value z = −0.75% discriminating recessions and ex-
pansions, i.e., realizations of the standardized transition variable z lower (higher)
than the threshold will be associated to recessions (expansions).19 Figure 2.2
plots the transition function F (zt). Clearly, high realizations of F (zt) tend to be
associated with NBER recessions. Importantly, our results are robust to the em-
ployment of alternative calibrations of the slope parameter γ that imply a number
of recessions in our sample ranging from 10% to 20%, where the lower bound is
determined by the minimum amount of observations each regime should contain
according to Hansen (1999) (checks not shown here for the sake of brevity, but
available upon request).
Identification of the anticipated fiscal shock. Following Fisher and Peters
(2010), we order the news variable ηg13 last in our vector and orthogonalize the
reduced-form residuals of the VAR via a Cholesky-decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix. We analyze the implications of this versus alternative strategies
to identify fiscal news shocks in Section 5.
Statistical evidence in favor of nonlinearity. For our vector of endogenous
variables Xt, we test and clearly reject the null hypothesis of linearity in favor of
the (Logistic) Smooth Transition Vector AutoRegression via the multivariate test
18The transition variable zt is standardized to render our calibration of γ comparable to
those employed in the literature. We employ a backward-looking moving average involving four
realizations of the real GDP growth rate.
19The corresponding threshold value for the non-standardized moving average real GDP
growth rate is equal to 0.34%. The sample mean of the non-standardized real GDP growth
rate in moving average terms is equal to 0.71, while its standard deviation is 0.50. Then, its
corresponding threshold value is obtained by "inverting" the formula we employed to obtain the
standardized transition indicator z, i.e., znonstd = −0.75× 0.50 + 0.71 = 0.34.
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proposed by Teräsvirta and Yang (2013) in presence of a single transition variable.
Details on this test and its implementation are presented in our Appendix.
Model estimation. Given the high nonlinearity of the model, we estimate it via
the Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain algorithm developed by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003). The (linear/nonlinear) VARs include three lags. This choice is based
on the Akaike criterion applied to a linear model estimated on the full-sample
1981Q3-2013Q1.
2.4 Generalized impulse responses and fiscal mul-
tipliers
This Section reports the estimated impulse responses to an anticipated fiscal
spending shock. Following Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), we compute general-
ized impulse responses to take into account the interaction between the evolution of
the variables in the vector Xt and the transition variable, the latter being directly
influenced by the evolution of output. In other words, we model the feedback from
the evolution of output in the vector Xt to the transition indicator zt and, conse-
quently, the probability F (zt−1). Hence, in computing our GIRFs, the probability
F (z) is endogenized.20Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Ehrmann, Ellison,
and Valla (2003) show that initial conditions affect the computation of the GIRFs.
In our benchmark exercise, we randomize over all possible histories within each
state, so to control for the role of initial conditions.21 We compute the GIRFs by
20Recall that our transition indicator zt ≡ 14 (∆Yt + ∆Yt−1 + ∆Yt−2 + ∆Yt−3), i.e., the rela-
tionship between zt and ∆Yt−i, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 features no stochastic elements. Hence, stochastic
singularity prevents us from estimating our model jointly with the evolution of zt. Following
Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), our GIRFs are based on simulations that take into account
the link between Xt and zt after the estimation of our econometric framework.
21Following Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), our GIRFs are computed as follows. First, we
draw an initial condition, i.e., starting values for the lags of our VARs as well as the transition
indicator z, which - given the logistic function (2.8) - gives us the value for F (z). Then, we
simulate two scenarios, one with all the shocks identified with the Cholesky decomposition of
the VCV matrix (2.7), and another one with the same shocks plus a δ > 0 corresponding to the
first realization of the news shock. The difference between these two scenarios (each of which
accounts for the evolution of F (z) by keeping track of the evolution of output and, therefore,
z) gives us the GIRFs to a fiscal news shock δ. Per each given initial condition z, we compute
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normalizing the news shocks to one.22
GIRFs. Figure 2.3 reports the impact of a government spending news shock
computed with our linear and nonlinear VARs. The responses obtained with our
linear model point to a delayed short-run increase in government expenditure and
output, and a decrease in government receipts. Public spending reaches its peak
value after about three years. Differently, output increases for the first three
quarters after the shock, then gradually goes back to zero, and crosses the zero
line about 10 quarters after the shock.
Next, we look at the evidence coming from the nonlinear VAR. Interestingly, the
estimated response of output is persistently stronger under recessions. Output
increases in expansions in the short-run, but the increase is much milder compared
to recessions, and vanishes after about four quarters. Another difference between
the two states is the reaction of government spending itself, which is always positive
but stronger in recessions. Tax receipts react asymmetrically in the short run, then
their patterns become more similar.
Are the reactions of output in recessions and expansions different from a statis-
tical standpoint? Figure 2.4 plots the GIRFs and the associated 90% confidence
intervals estimated for both states. Focusing on output, we see that the confidence
bands overlap substantially. This result suggests that the reaction of output to
a fiscal shock is not necessarily stronger if the economy is slack. This finding is
in line with some recent results put forth by Valerie Ramey and coauthors (see
Ramey, 2011b; Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy, 2013; Ramey and Zubairy, 2014),
which are obtained with a different identification strategy (fiscal spending news
shocks constructed following Ramey, 2011b) and methodology (local projections
500 different stochastic realizations of our GIRFs, then store the median realization. We repeat
these steps until 500 initial conditions (drawn by allowing for repetitions) associated to recessions
(expansions) are considered. Then, we construct the distribution of our GIRFs by considering
these 500 median realizations. Our Appendix provides details on the algorithm we employed to
compute the GIRFs.
22The standard deviation of the news variable employed in the sample is 0.19 according to our
linear model, 0.21 conditional on our framework under recessions, and 0.18 under expansions.
While being theoretically size-dependent, we verified that the sensitivity of our impulse responses
to reasonable changes in the size of the shock is negligible.
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à la Jordá, 2005). At a first glance, the evidence seems to be at odds with the im-
pulse response analysis proposed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a),
who find a statistically significant difference between the response of output con-
ditional on different states. However, a subtle difference in the construction of
the dynamic responses must be considered. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012,
2013a) assume the economy hit by the fiscal shock to start and remain in a reces-
sion/expansion for twenty quarters. Differently, here we allow the economic system
to switch from a state to another according to the endogenous evolution of the
transition indicator. Moreover, the GIRFs plotted in Figure 2.4 are constructed
by integrating over all histories belonging to a given state (recessions, expansions).
We elaborate on the role played by initial conditions in Section 5.
Quantifying the multipliers. We now turn to the key issue of computing the
multipliers and the associated 90% confidence intervals. We compute the "sum"
(cumulative) multiplier as the integral of the response of output divided by the
integral of the response of fiscal expenditure, i.e.,
∑H
h=1 Yh/
∑H
h=1Gh, where H is a
chosen horizon. Percent changes are then converted into dollars by rescaling such
a ratio by the sample mean ratio of the levels of output over public spending.23
This measure is designed to account for the persistence of fiscal shocks (Woodford,
2011).
Our results are reported in Table 2.3, where multipliers have been computed con-
sidering horizons from one to five years. The evidence clearly speaks in favor of
larger (short-run) fiscal spending multipliers in recessions, with values between 3.05
after 8 quarters and 1.00 after 20 quarters. The point-estimates of our multipliers
in expansions are substantially lower (from 0.33 to -2.27 after 8 and 20 quarters,
23Ramey and Zubairy (2014) warn against this practice by noticing that, in a long U.S. data
sample spanning the 1889-2011 period, the output-over-public spending ratio varies from 2 to
24 with a mean of 8. Hence, the choice of a constant value for such ratio may importantly bias
the estimation of the multipliers. In our sample, the mean value of such a ratio is 6, and it
varies from 5.39 to 6.76. Hence, the commonly adopted ex-post conversion from the estimated
elasticities to dollar increases does not appear to be an issue for our exercise. The average value
of the output-public spending ratio in our sample in 5.81 in NBER recessions, and 6.02 in NBER
expansions. Our results are robust to the employment of state-dependent output-public spending
ratios.
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respectively). The multipliers under recession are statistically larger than one in
the short run (i.e., for the first four quarters)
Are multipliers statistically bigger in recessions? We answer this question by con-
structing a test based on the difference between the multiplier estimated under
recessions and expansions. Such a test is constructed to account for the corre-
lation between the estimated state-dependent multipliers.24 Figure 2.5 plots the
distribution of the difference for both measures of multipliers (peak, sum) and for
a range of horizons of our impulse responses along with 90% confidence bands.
Evidence in favor of state-dependent multipliers would be gained if zero were not
included in the confidence bands. In all cases, although marginally, the difference
turns out to be not different from a statistical standpoint.25
The stabilizing effects of anticipated fiscal shocks. Our STVAR allows
also to estimate the impact of government spending shocks on the probability of
being in a recession for each given horizon of interest after the shock. Figure 2.6
plots the estimated transition function implied by our model, F̂ (z), along with
the 90% confidence bands. The Figure gives interesting information about the
estimated impact of a positive government spending shock on the likelihood of
remaining in the same phase of the business cycle. Looking at the behavior of
the F̂ (z) under recession, we notice that the fiscal shock leads to a clear drop in
the probability of remaining in recession. Given the large uncertainty surrounding
the response of output to a fiscal shock, different paths of F̂ (z) are admittedly
possible. However, the median indication clearly suggests a quick fall of such a
probability under the threshold value F = 0.85 just after five quarters, which is
exactly the average duration of a NBER recession in the sample. In terms of
24In short, we compute differences of our multipliers in recessions vs. expansions conditional
on the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our model as well as the same realizations
of the coefficients of the vector. The empirical density of the difference between our multipliers
is based on 500 realizations of such differences for each horizon of interest.
25Importantly, our results are not driven by the systematic component of our STVAR per
se. In other words, in absence of fiscal interventions, our model economy does not deliver large
negative accumulated multipliers at longer forecast horizons when starting in expansions. This
was verified by simulating a deterministic version of the STVAR, in which only initial conditions
are responsible for the different evolution of the variables in recessions and expansions. Our
simulations confirm that our cumulated multipliers are indeed driven by the interaction between
fiscal shocks and the systematic component of our STVARs.
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the econometric methodology employed to estimate the state-dependent effect of
government spending shocks on output, this evidence shows the importance of
allowing for the possibility of switching from one phase of the business cycle to
another. Unsurprisingly, given its expansionary effect, the probability of falling
into a recession after the news shock when starting from an expansions is basically
zero, though such a probability is quite imprecisely estimated.
2.5 Fiscal multipliers in presence of "extreme" events
Extreme events analysis. So far, our analysis has focused on the possible state-
dependence of output reactions to fiscal news shocks and fiscal multipliers, finding
weak evidence in favor of countercyclical spending multipliers. The next question
we address is whether evidence of nonlinearities might arise when recessions and
expansions are "extreme" events. We then re-compute the GIRFs by randomizing
over different subsets of histories associated to recessions and expansions. We la-
bel "deep" recessions/"strong" expansions the histories associated to realizations
of the transition variable which are below/above two standard deviations. Given
that our transition variable is standardized, this amounts to saying that all his-
torical realizations of z above two are associated to a strong expansion, while all
realizations below minus two are associated to a deep recession. This criterion
leads us to isolate four realizations in deep recessions corresponding to the re-
cent great recession (2008Q4-2009Q3) and three realizations which belong to the
"strong" expansions category (1983Q4-1984Q2). In a complementary fashion, mild
recessions/weak expansions are associated to histories consistent with realizations
of the transition variable below/above the threshold value z = −0.75 but within
the range [−2, 2]. We then re-compute the GIRFs by randomizing over histories
within each of these four sub-categories.
Figure 2.7 shows the GIRFs obtained by distinguishing between "deep" and "mild"
recessions and "strong" and "weak" expansions. The estimated GIRFs show that
the response of output is roughly proportional to the strength of the recession
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(expansion). Although in the short-run the response of output in the case of a
"mild" recession is very similar to the response of output in a "deep" recession, the
response of output is much more persistent at longer horizons when conditioning
on the latter case. This, however, cannot be immediately turned into evidence
about multipliers, since the persistence in output response might be driven by the
persistence of government spending.
Table 2.4 reports the fiscal multipliers estimated in the four different cases under
scrutiny. Interestingly, multipliers are still larger in recessions relative to expan-
sions, regardless of the strength of the recession (expansion). When the economy
is in a deep recession, we find 4-year horizon multipliers to be 1.6. A similar fig-
ures can be gauged for mild recessions, where government spending is found to be
expansionary after up to four years. In strong expansions, short-run (one-year)
multipliers are slightly above one, but they take negative value at longer horizons.
Interestingly, while the difference between mild recessions and weak expansions
might seem minimal, the impact of fiscal policy in these two states is much more
dramatic. Such a difference may be interpreted in light of the different response
of fiscal revenues in the two states (at least in the short-run). In good times, gov-
ernment receipts are found to increase after the shock, while in bad times they are
found to decrease. In other words, our VAR suggests that recessions are associated
to deficit-financed increases in public spending, while expansions are associated to
increases in fiscal spending which are readily financed via an increase in revenues.
Hence, recessions are associated with a higher net present value of the fiscal deficit
relative to expansions. This can justify the large and positive real effects of fis-
cal news on the output multiplier if, during recessions, the Ricardian equivalence
does not hold because of, say, binding liquidity constraints during recessions, of
rule-of-thumb consumers. It can also offer a rationale for the negative multipliers
in strong expansions, which is a state associated with a clearly positive response
of revenues to fiscal spending shocks.26
26See Barro and Redlick (2011) for a discussion of deficit-financed versus balanced-budget
fiscal multipliers.
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Turning to multipliers in expansions, while our point estimates suggest values
above one in the short-run, 90% confidence bands imply that we cannot reject
values lower than unity. A possible interpretation of large short-run multipliers in
expansions relates to the zero lower bound, which has been in place even after the
end of the 2007-09 recession, hence in a period classified as ("weak") expansion in
our sample. As shown by Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012), multipliers may be
larger than one when an active fiscal policy is accompanied by a passive monetary
policy.27
When we turn to statistical difference, a comparison between the multipliers in
the case of "deep" recessions and those conditional on "strong" expansions sug-
gests that the confidence bands do not overlap, and point to a strong evidence in
terms of nonlinear responses of the economy to an expansionary fiscal shock. Our
results are confirmed also by looking at the distribution of the difference between
the estimated state-dependent multipliers. As shown in Figure 2.8, the counter-
cyclicality of fiscal multipliers conditional on extreme realizations of the business
cycle is supported regardless of the horizon.
In our context, it might be more appropriate to test for the null hypothesis of
equal multipliers versus the one-sided alternative of multipliers larger in reces-
sions relative to expansions. Table 2.5 collects the fraction of multipliers that
are larger in recessions for both "Normal" (recessions/expansions) and "Extreme"
(deep recessions/strong expansions) phases of the business cycle. As before, these
numbers are estimated by referring to different initial conditions, all else being
equal. Hence, any entry greater than or equal to 90 might be interpreted as evi-
dence in favor of larger multipliers in recessions at a 90% confidence level in the
context of a one-sided test. The figures corresponding to the exercises conducted
so far refer to the "Baseline" scenario. Under the "Normal" (i.e. all recessions vs.
all expansions) case, evidence in favor of countercyclical multipliers is not present
27 In our sample, the number of quarters associated to expansions by the NBER in which the
zero lower bound is in place is 15, i.e., some 14% of all the quarters in expansions according
to the NBER, which is a non-negligible share. For an analysis pointing to lower fiscal spending
multipliers in a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence in a model with
nominal rigidies and a Taylor-type interest rate rule, see Mertens and Ravn (2014).
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for all horizons. Differently, the analysis of extreme events robustly points towards
larger multipliers during recessions. We postpone the analysis of the robustness
of this result to a number of perturbations of the baseline framework to the next
Section.
How does the economic system evolve after a fiscal shock hitting during an extreme
phase of the business cycle? Figure 2.9 plots the estimated value of the F̂ (z)
conditional on the four scenarios. For deep recessions, a sizeable decrease of the
probability of remaining in such a state occurs as a consequence of the government
spending shock: after about five quarters, the value of F̂ (z) decreases from 1 (the
economy is in a recession with probability one) to about 0.5 (the economy is
unlikely to be in a recession). This drop is quicker and more substantial than
the one estimated in presence of mild recessions, and it is also more precisely
estimated. Importantly, this suggests that government spending can be effective
in lifting the U.S. economy from a deep recession to an expansionary path. The
probability of moving away from a strong expansion is low, and more precisely
estimated than the one of drifting away from a weak expansion. However, none of
the two suggests a high likelihood of falling into a recession.
Estimated multipliers: Comparison with the literature. Our evidence
points to larger multipliers in recessions (around 1.6 for the 4-year horizon), and
smaller ones, but still somewhat high in the short-run (slightly larger than 1 after
one year), in expansions. Are these multipliers in line with what suggested by the
literature? A close look at some recent contributions suggests a positive answer.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a) deal with unexpected fiscal shocks in
a nonlinear VAR framework and find multipliers in recessions of about 2.5. Bach-
mann and Sims (2012) control for the effects of business confidence and find the
sum and peak multipliers in recessions to be 2.7 and 3.3, respectively. Corsetti,
Meier, and Müller (2012) work with a flexible panel of OECD countries that allow
them to study the effects of fiscal spending shocks under different scenarios. Con-
ditional on periods of financial strains, they find fiscal spending multipliers to be
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2.3 on impact, 2.9 at the peak, and larger than 2 in the medium run.28 Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) work with a medium-scale DSGE model and find
a multiplier of 2.3 conditional on the zero-lower bound being in place for one year.
Evidence of large multipliers can be found also in linear frameworks which deal
with the issue of fiscal foresight. Using Bayesian prior predictive analysis for a
battery of closed- and open-economy DSGE models featuring different frictions
and policy conducts, Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2011) rationalize fiscal spend-
ing multipliers of two or larger. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) find a peak multiplier
larger than 4. Fisher and Peters (2010), using their measure of excess returns of
large U.S. military contractors, find a multiplier of 1.5. The same figure is found
by Ricco (2014), who employes a measure of news which accounts for the changes
in the composition of the pool of forecasters compiling the SPF questionnaires.
Depending on the set of restrictions imposed in their sign restriction-VAR analy-
sis, Canova and Pappa (2011) find the U.S. fiscal multipliers to range between 2
and 4.
Our findings qualify those by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), who
suggest that recessions are associated with larger fiscal spending multipliers. As
already pointed out, their general conclusion might be driven by the implicit as-
sumption that all recessions are treated like "extreme events" when conducting
their impulse response analysis. Our analysis suggests that this may very well
be the case. This finding has important implications from a policy perspective
too, given that a fiscal stimulus may be needed exactly in correspondence to deep
recessions.
Overall, our analysis based on "disaggregated" recessions and expansions shows
that nonlinearities are likely to arise when we look within each of the two states
typically investigated in a business cycle context, i.e., recessions and expansions.
In particular, we find support in favor of a larger fiscal multiplier when deep
recessions are considered.
28As reported in the minutes of the Economic Policy Panel Discussion, Giancarlo Corsetti
pointed out that financial crises, in their study, are not meant to represent recessions. However,
he also added that the multipliers are even larger when one uses macro crisis episodes alone in
their panel approach. See Economic Policy, 2012, 27(72), p. 562.
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2.6 Further investigations
Our baseline analysis suggests that evidence in favor of countercyclical fiscal mul-
tipliers is borderline when we condition upon recessions vs. expansions, while it
becomes much clearer and solid when conditioning upon extreme events. This
Section discusses the solidity of our results to the employment of i) alternative
identification strategies; ii) a longer sample; iii) debt; iv) several different VAR
specifications.
2.6.1 Identification
Exogeneity of the change in government spending expectations. Our
baseline analysis rests on revisions of government spending expectations. Such
revisions may in principle be due to shocks other than merely fiscal ones. Suppose
that gt = δzt + ξt, where zt is a vector of m indicators of the business cycle (say,
output, unemployment, inflation, interest rates), δ is the vector of loadings relating
zt to gt, and ξt = εt+φ1εt−1+φ2εt−2+...+φnεt−n is a moving average process mod-
eling the unexpected fiscal shock εt as well as the expected ones εt−j, j = 1, ..., n.
Then, ηg13 =
∑3
j=1(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) = δ
∑3
j=1(Etzt+j − Et−1zt+j) + η˜g13, where
η˜g13 =
∑3
j=1 φjεt−j. In words, systematic revisions of fiscal spending forecasts might
be due not only to anticipated fiscal shocks, but also to revisions of other vari-
ables' forecasts possibly due to other shocks (technology, financial). We deal with
this issue by regressing our measure of fiscal news ηg13 on a number of macroe-
conomic indicators available to professional forecasters when they are asked to
form expectations about G: (the sums of forecasts revisions of) real GDP growth,
unemployment, GDP deflator inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the
10-year Treasury bond rate.29 Figure 2.10 displays the raw and purged versions of
29Forecasts of the debt-to-GDP ratio are not included in the SPF survey. We run further
regressions by adding lagged realizations of debt-to-GDP ratio to the regression described in the
text. Such measures turn out to be insignificant. The choice of not including the contemporane-
ous realizations of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the right-hand side of the regression is due to the
timing of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The questionnaire of such survey is sent
to the pool of respondents after the advance report of the national income and product accounts
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is released to the public. Hence, the questionnaire
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the news variable, denoted by ηg13 and η˜
g
13 respectively. Two considerations are in
order. First, the correlation between these two variables is quite high (0.95). Sec-
ond, the most extreme realizations, documented in Figure 2.1 and reproposed here,
are clearly captured by both variables. Hence, most of the information content
of the (unpurged version of the) ηg13 variable is likely to come from its genuinely
exogenous component. To corroborate this statement, we replace the ηg13 variable
with its purged version η˜g13 in our VAR, and re-run our estimations and simula-
tions. Table 2.6 ("η˜g13 last") collects the results of this exercise for our extreme
events analysis.30 These results, as well as those in Table 2.5 on the difference of
the multipliers in extreme business cycle phases, confirm our baseline findings.
Contemporaneous effects of fiscal spending shocks. Another issue affecting
our baseline analysis regards the timing of the impact of the news shocks. The
baseline vector features a recursive identification scheme in which the news variable
is ordered last. This choice aims at purging the movements of the ηg13 fiscal variable
by accounting for its systematic response to government spending, tax revenues,
and output. However, such a choice has an obvious limitation, i.e., output is
not allowed to move immediately after the realization of the news shock. We
then perform a robustness check by focusing on the four-variate VAR X η˜
g
t =
[η˜g13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt]
′, which enables fiscal news shocks to affect output on impact.31 We
run this exercise with our purged measure of anticipated fiscal shocks to control for
the systematic movements of fiscal news due to news hitting other macroeconomic
indicators, as explained above. Table 2.6 ("η˜g13 last") documents slightly different,
but statistically equivalent, multipliers relative to the baseline. Most importantly,
as also documented by Table 2.5, we find again larger multipliers in deep recessions
than in strong expansions.
contains the first estimate of GDP and its components for the previous quarter. Thus, in for-
mulating and submitting their projections, the information sets of the SPF panelists include the
data reported in the advance report and related to quarter t− 1 but not data regarding quarter
t. For information on the variables included in the survey and the information set possessed by
respondents, see http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey .
30Multipliers computed by considering a four-year time span. Similar results are obtained
when considering a two-year time span.
31An alternative, not pursued here, would be to work with sign restrictions. For an analysis
of sign restrictions in fiscal VARs and their implications for the implied fiscal elasticities, see
Caldara and Kamps (2012).
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2.6.2 Longer sample
The nonlinear estimator we employ is data intensive. Because of limited data
availability for the SPF forecast revisions, our baseline analysis rests on a rela-
tively short sample, i.e., 1981Q3-2013Q1. Hence, small-sample issues may lead to
distortions of our estimated coefficients, which could then lead us to obtain biased
multipliers. We then conduct a robustness check by employing a much longer sam-
ple, i.e., 1947Q1-2013Q1. To do so, we use an updated version of Ramey (2011b)
widely known fiscal news variable (available at Valerie Ramey's website), and put
it first in a VAR including fiscal spending, fiscal revenues, and output. Following
Ramey (2011b), we estimate a VAR with four lags and a quadratic trend. Table
2.6 ("Long sample, Ramey's news") collects the outcome of our estimations. Re-
assuringly, this exercise produces multipliers very much in line with our baseline
ones, and it offers support to the importance of looking at extreme events to find
nonlinearities in the fiscal multipliers even in long samples.
2.6.3 The role of debt
Our baseline VAR does not feature debt. However, controlling for debt fluctuations
in our regressions is important to better understand the drivers of our countercycli-
cal multipliers. The reason is simple. Recent panel-data studies have shown that
countries with "high" levels of debt have smaller multipliers than countries with
lower levels of debt (see, e.g., Corsetti, Meier, and Müller, 2012; Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Végh, 2013). Hence, it could in principle be possible that the nonlinearities we
have found are driven by different levels of debt rather than different phases of the
business cycle. It is then of interest to check if the relevant initial conditions could
be related to different degrees of fiscal distress. To this aim, we modify our baseline
vector along two dimensions. First, we include the debt/GDP ratio in our VAR.
Following a common modeling choice in the literature (see, among others, Leeper,
Traum, and Walker, 2011; Corsetti, Meier, and Müller, 2012; Leeper, Walker, and
Yang, 2013), we assume the debt/GDP ratio to affect the fiscal instruments with
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a lag, and put it last in the vector. Second, we employ our debt/GDP ratio as
the variable which dictates the switch from a regime to another. This second
modification is exactly aimed at capturing the idea of different "debt-contingent"
regimes. To discriminate between "high" vs. "low" realizations of debt, we focus
on the cyclical component of the debt/GDP ratio, which is extracted from the
raw series (in log) by applying a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing
weight equal to 1,600. Realizations of the debt/GDP ratio one standard devi-
ation above (below) the HP-trend are interpreted as phases of "high" ("low")
debt. Positive (negative) realizations within one standard deviation are classified
as "moderately high" ("moderately low"). A possible interpretation of this series
is that of a "debt/GDP gap" computed by considering a time-varying debt/GDP
target, which may be consistent with the clear upward-trending behavior displayed
by this ratio in our sample.
Table 2.6 ("Debt/GDP ratio") collects the multipliers produced by this exercise.
We distinguish between extreme phases of "high" and "low" fiscal distress, as well
as intermediate ones, i.e. "moderately high" and "moderately low", which we
indicate with "Mod.+ debt" and "Mod.− debt", respectively. Our results point to
fairly similar fiscal multipliers when computed conditional on "high" vs. "low"
debt levels. Hence, countercyclical fiscal multipliers do not seem to be guided by
the "fiscal cycle".32 Our results echo those by Favero and Giavazzi (2012), who
also find no major empirical differences in a fiscal model for the U.S. when adding
debt. It is important to stress, however, that this conclusion is not inconsistent
with cross-country studies which point to relevant nonlinearities of fiscal policy
effects due to different levels of debt, in particular for developing countries.
2.6.4 Further robustness checks
Our results are robust to a variety of further perturbations of our baseline model,
which include: i) a "FAST-VAR" (Factor Augmented Smooth Transition-VAR)
32An analysis conducted by adding the debt-to-GDP ratio to our otherwise baseline framework
while keeping the moving average of real GDP as our transition indicator returned multipliers
very similar to our baseline ones.
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version of our VAR model, which we estimate to further control for nonfunda-
mentalness as suggested by Forni and Gambetti (2014a); ii) the estimation of a
five-variate VAR featuring the sum of forecast revisions regarding future real GDP
as first variable in the vector, again to control for revisions of real GDP forecasts;
iii) the employment of revisions over total spending forecasts (as opposed to Fed-
eral spending only); iv) a measure of news which accounts for the changes in the
composition of the pool of forecasters compiling the SPF questionnaires as in Ricco
(2014).33 The solidity of our baseline results is confirmed also by this battery of
robustness checks, which is available upon request.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper quantifies the fiscal spending multiplier in the U.S. and tests the theo-
retical prediction of a larger reaction of output to fiscal shocks in economic down-
turns. Following Gambetti (2012a) (2012; 2012) and Forni and Gambetti (2014a),
we tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness due to fiscal foresight by identifying
anticipated government spending shocks via sums of forecasts revisions collected
by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. We show that such a measure of fis-
cal spending news carries relevant information to predict the future evolution of
fiscal expenditures and Granger-causes other measures of fiscal news recently pro-
posed in the literature. Then, we augment a macro-fiscal nonlinear VAR with this
measure of fiscal news and estimate the size of fiscal spending multipliers across
different phases of the business cycle.
Our empirical investigation points to fiscal multipliers larger than one in reces-
sionary periods. However, conditional on a standard "recession vs. expansion"
classification of the phases of the U.S. business cycle, our results do not support
the idea of a countercylical fiscal multiplier. Differently, when we condition the
estimates of the fiscal multipliers on the strength of the business cycle (namely,
33We thank Giovanni Ricco for providing us with his measure of fiscal news.
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when we distinguish between deep and mild recessions, and weak and strong ex-
pansions), we find that fiscal multipliers are statistically larger in deep recessions
relative to strong expansionary periods.
The results of our paper highlight the relevance of the different initial economic
conditions within each of the two states typically considered for classifying the U.S.
business cycle. Fiscal multipliers may very well be larger when a fiscal shock occurs
in presence of a deep recession like that of 2007-09 than when it occurs in presence
of milder economic downturns. Our results imply that a correct measurement of
the fiscal multipliers can be performed just if flexible-enough econometric models
are put at work.
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Table 2.1: Anticipated fiscal spending shocks: Statistical relevance
News (1, 3) (1, 1) (2, 2) (3, 3) (0, 0)
p− value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Notes: P-values related to the exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged News variables entering
(one at a time) a regression involving government spending (dependent variable), a constant,
three lags of government spending, three lags of fiscal receipts, and three lags of real GDP.
Figures in bold are associated to a predictive power of news found to be significant at a 10
percent confidence level. News are expressed in cumulated terms to have an order of integration
comparable to that of the other variables. Estimation conducted by considering Newey-West
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 2.2: News á la Ramey vs. forecast revisions: Granger-causality tests
Sample Ramey ηg13 ORZ η
g
13
1981:III-2008:IV 0.44 0.06
1986:IV-2008:IV 0.28 0.02
1981:III-2010:IV 0.71 0.06
1986:IV-2010:IV 0.59 0.02
Notes: 'Ramey' stands for the news variable employed by Ramey (2011), 'ORZ' stands for its
updated version employed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). P-values related to the
exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged covariate of interest. Figures in bold are associated to
a predictive power of news found to be significant at a 10 percent confidence level. Results based
on a bivariate VAR with one lag. Null hypothesis: Column variable does not Granger cause the
alternative news measure.
Table 2.3: Fiscal spending multipliers
Sum
Horizon/State Expansion Recession
4 1.73
[0.52,3.50]
3.15
[1.71,4.27]
8 0.33
[−1.05,2.77]
3.05
[0.68,4.70]
12 −0.57
[−2.24,1.54]
2.13
[0.13,3.82]
16 −1.41
[−3.96,0.74]
1.54
[−0.42,2.95]
20 −2.27
[−6.23,−0.01]
1.00
[−0.94,2.47]
Notes: Figures conditional on our baseline VAR analysis. Log-values of the impulse response
of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Table 2.4: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events
Sum
Hor./State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
4 1.03
[−0.51,2.03]
3.42
[2.05,4.35]
1.69
[0.64,3.40]
3.09
[1.71,4.14]
8 −0.26
[−2.01,0.84]
3.42
[1.22,5.14]
0.30
[−0.87,2.83]
2.94
[0.56,4.46]
12 −1.32
[−3.68,−0.03]
2.21
[0.61,3.54]
−0.62
[−2.15,1.48]
2.06
[0.03,3.78]
16 −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
20 −3.28
[−7.00,−1.56]
1.09
[−0.31,2.07]
−2.37
[−6.08,0.01]
0.83
[−0.97,2.54]
Notes: Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional on four different sets of
initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of
output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
Table 2.5: Fiscal spending multipliers: Shares of multipliers larger in recessions
Sum
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 84.8 91.6 93.6 95.4 96.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 last Normal 78.2 86.4 89.4 90.6 92.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 first Normal 58.2 76.2 82.2 89.8 92.0
Extreme 71.6 93.0 97.8 98.8 99.2
Long sample (Ramey's news) Normal 82.8 89.6 87.6 86.4 86.6
Extreme 90.2 92.8 92.8 93.0 93.6
Notes: Normal scenarios- Fraction of multipliers which are larger in recessions than expansions
out of 500 draws from their empirical distributions. Extreme scenarios- Fraction of multipliers
which are larger in deep recessions than strong expansions out of 500 draws from their empirical
distributions. 'h' identifies the number of quarters after the shock.
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Table 2.6: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events. Different Scenarios
Sum
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
η˜g13 last −1.57
[−2.92,−0.91]
2.28
[1.23,3.10]
−0.44
[−1.97,2.29]
2.16
[0.22,3.00]
η˜g13 first −0.70
[−2.50,0.43]
2.36
[0.99,4.29]
0.66
[−1.04,2.90]
2.50
[0.59,4.39]
Long sample (Ramey's news) 0.15
[−0.24,0.53]
1.74
[0.08,3.92]
0.07
[−1.23,0.96]
1.52
[0.60,4.62]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 0.68
[0.15,1.37]
0.74
[−1.02,1.15]
1.33
[0.95,1.66]
1.33
[0.81,1.97]
Notes: Four-year integral multipliers. Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs
conditional on four different sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 2.1: News13 (this paper) vs. Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy's (2013)
news variable
Notes: Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters' forecast revisions regarding future public spending from one-to-three quarter-
ahead. Extreme values, interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reagan's "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars"
speeches; (b) 1986Q1: Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats a quarter
before; (d) 1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4:
War in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1: Obama's stimulus package. Red, dashed line: News variable
constructed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), who extended Ramey's (2011) news vari-
able up to 2010Q4. Ramey's (2011) variable is constructed by considering the present discounted
value of expected changes in defense spending (nominal spending divided by nominal GDP one
period before). Both news measures in this Figure are standardized.
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Figure 2.2: Probability of being in a recessionary phase
Notes: F (z) computed according to the logistic function presented in the text. Transition
variable: Standardized backward-looking moving average constructed with four realizations of
the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Generalized impulse responses to a fiscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Linear model, recessions, expansions.
Notes: Median responses to a fiscal news shock normalized to one. News variable constructed
as the sum of the revisions of the one, two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future
fiscal spending growth. News variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of
integration as the one of the log-real variables in the vector. Log-values of the impulse response
of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 2.4: Generalized impulse responses to a fiscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Recessions vs expansions.
Notes: Median responses to a fiscal news shock normalized to one. 90 percent confidence intervals
identified with gray areas (recessions) and circled lines (expansions). Red dashed lines: Reces-
sions. Dotted blue lines: Expansions. News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of
the one, two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future fiscal spending growth. News
variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of integration as the one of the
log-real variables in the vector. Sample 1981Q3-2013Q1. VAR models estimated with a constant
and three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of
output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 2.6: Evolution of the probability of being in a recessionary phase F(z)
consistent with our GIRFs
Notes: Solid lines: Median reactions. Blue dotted/red dashed lines: 90 percent confidence
intervals. Black dashed horizontal line: Threshold value to switch from a regime to another.
Probability computed according to the logistic function presented in the text and the evolution
of output conditional on a fiscal news shock. Transition variable: Standardized backward-looking
moving average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth
rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 2.7: Generalized impulse responses to a fiscal news (anticipated) spend-
ing shock: Linear model, deep vs. mild recessions, strong vs. weak expansions
Notes: Deep recessions/strong expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of
our transition variable which are below/above two standard deviations. Mild recessions/weak ex-
pansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of our transition variable below/above
-0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Median responses to a fiscal news shock normalized to one.
News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of the one, two, and three step-ahead
expectation values over future fiscal spending growth. News variable expressed in cumulated
terms to have the same order of integration as the one of the log-real variables in the vector.
VAR models estimated with a constant and three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 2.9: Evolution of the probability of being in a recessionary phase F(z)
consistent with our GIRFs: Extreme events
Notes: Median reactions and 90 percent confidence intervals. Black dashed horizontal line:
Threshold value to switch from a regime to another. Deep recessions/strong expansions asso-
ciated to histories consistent with realizations of our transition variable which are below/above
two standard deviations. Mild recessions/weak expansions associated to histories consistent with
realizations of our transition variable below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Probability
computed according to the logistic function presented in the text and the evolution of output
conditional on a fiscal news shock. Transition variable: Standardized backward-looking moving
average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Value
of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 2.10: News13 vs. News13 purged
Notes: Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters' forecast revisions regarding future public spending from one to three period-
ahead. Red, dashed line: News variable constructed by regressing News13 over a constant and
the sums of the forecasts revisions of real GDP growth, unemployment, GDP deflator infla-
tion, the three-month Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate. Extreme values,
interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reagan's "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1:
Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats a quarter before; (d) 1987Q4:
Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4: War in Afghanistan;
(g) 2009Q1: Obama's stimulus package. Both news measures in this Figure are standardized
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Appendix 2A
This Appendix reports further details on non-fundamentalness in fiscal SVARs
and the role of expectations revisions, the estimation of our nonlinear VARs, the
computation of the Generalized Impulse Responses, a number of robustness checks
not included in the paper and the computation of the factors employed in one of
our robustness checks.
Non-fundamentalness and the role of expectations revisions
Structural VARs have been extensively employed to recover the impulse responses
of key macroeconomic variables to fiscal shocks. The implicit assumption when
working with SVARs is that their VMA representations are invertible in the past,
or in other words that they are fundamental Wold representations of the vector
of interest. When such conditions are met, the econometrician has the same in-
formation set as the economic agents and can recover the structural shocks by
conditioning the VAR estimates on past and current observables.
Fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness. It is well known, however, that in
presence of fiscal foresight (and news shocks in general), this assumption may not
hold and fundamental shocks to fiscal policy cannot be recovered from past and
current observations. The non-fundamentalness is due to the different discount
patterns employed by agents and the econometrician: while the agents attach a
larger weight to realizations of the shock occurring in the past, the econometrician
discounts in the usual way, and attach lower weights to past observations compared
to more recent ones, the reason being that the econometrician's information set
lags that of the agents (Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2013). Hence, in presence of
a non-fundamental process, an econometrician not endowed with a large enough
information set will not be able to correctly recover the impulse response function
of a variable of interest to the structural shock.
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How severe is the non-fundamentalness problem? As pointed out by Sims (2012)
and Beaudry and Portier (2014), the answer to this question depends on the very
same process(es) one wants to model. In terms of fiscal shocks, Leeper, Walker,
and Yang (2013) convincingly show that when non-fundamentalness holds the
magnitude of the error is quite severe. They employ two DSGE models of the
business cycle - a calibrated RBC model and an estimated DSGE model with a
number of nominal and real frictions á la Smets and Wouters (2007) - to quantify
the mistake an econometrician makes when failing to model fiscal foresight. They
show that fiscal multipliers may turn out to be off by hundreds of percent, and
can even get the wrong sign.34 Moreover, Forni and Gambetti (2010b) and Ramey
(2011b) show that government spending shocks estimated with standard fiscal
VARs can be predicted, evidence supporting the case for non-fundamentalness.
VAR analysis in presence of anticipated shocks. In this section, we propose
a framework to fix ideas about the relationship between fiscal foresight and non-
fundamentalness and to discuss how the problem can be tackled. To this aim,
consider the model
yt = δEtyt+1 + gt + ωt (2A.1)
gt = εt−h + φ1εt−h−1 + . . .+ φq−hεt−q = Φ(L)εt (2A.2)
where |δ| < 1, φi > 0 ∀i, h ≥ 0, q ≥ h. The forward-looking process yt - say, output
measured as log-deviations from its trend - is affected by the exogenous stationary
process gt - say, a fiscal shock - plus a random shock ωt, which is assumed to cap-
ture non-fiscal spending shocks affecting output and which is assumed to be i.i.d.
with zero mean and unit variance. The process (2A.2) features an unanticipated
contemporaneous shock εt as well as anticipated shocks εt−h for h > 0, where h
is the number of foresight periods. The latter are known in advance by rational
agents, i.e., agents foresee fiscal moves occurring h-periods ahead. The process gt
34Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013) model fiscal foresight associated to tax policies. Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2012) find government spending shocks anticipated up to eight quarters to be
responsible of about 60% of the overall variability of government spending.
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is a news-rich process if |φi| > 1 for at least one i > 0 (Beaudry and Portier, 2014).
In all cases, {εt−j}qj=h is said to be fundamental for gt if the roots of the polynomial
Φ(L) lie outside the unit circle (Hansen and Sargent, 1991). Importantly, if the
gt process is non-fundamental, its structural shock is not recoverable by employ-
ing current and past realizations of gt only. Consequently, its impulse response
to an anticipated shock as well as the dynamic responses of other variables  in
this example, yt  will not be correctly recovered by estimating a VAR in yt and
gt. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, consider the case in which the
unanticipated component is zero, i.e., h > 0. We assume that agents have rational
expectations and observe news shocks without noise.35 To begin with, consider
the case h = q = 1, so that36
gt = εt−1.
Under rational expectations, the solution for the process yt reads
yt = δεt + εt−1 + ωt. (2A.3)
The VMA representation of the vector (yt, gt) is:[
yt
gt
]
=
 δ 1
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
 1 0
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
. (2A.4)
The VMA representation (2A.4) is fundamental if all the roots of |∑qi=0 Aizi| in
absolute value lie outside the unit circle. It is easy to verify that in this case the
condition is not met, since one gets |z| = 0. Hence, in this economic system,
inference based on an estimated VAR which includes yt and gt only would be
incorrect.
35 Forni, Gambetti, Lippi, and Sala (2013) investigate the case in which economic agents deal
with noisy news. Agents are assumed to receive signals regarding the future realization of TFP
shocks. Since such signals are noisy, agents react not only to genuinely informative news, but
also to noise shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals. They find that such noise
shocks explain about a third of the variance of output, consumption, and investment. We leave
the quantification of the role of noise shocks in the fiscal context to future research.
36 This process is termed "degenerated news-rich process" by Beaudry and Portier (2014). For
an application, see Féve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2009).
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Importantly, if a variable ηt added to the econometrician's information set contains
"enough" information about the structural shock εt, then the VMA representation
becomes invertible and the non-fundamentalness issue is circumvented (Giannone
and Reichlin, 2006; Sims, 2012; Beaudry and Portier, 2014; Forni and Gambetti,
2014b). Based on this argument, a way to tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness
is to include in the VAR a variable which is informative about the effects that
news shocks exert on the endogenous variables of interest.37 In the case of fiscal
foresight, then, one has to find a measure of anticipated fiscal spending shocks to
correctly gauge the reaction of output to such shocks. It is easy to show that,
in the context of model (2A.4) , replacing gt with its one-step-ahead forecast, i.e.
Etgt+1, leads to a fundamental VMA representation for the vector (yt, Etgt+1):
[
yt
Etgt+1
]
=
 δ 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
 1 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
.
This can be seen by verifying that |A0 + A1z| 6= 0, ∀z.
It is important to notice that expectations per se do not necessarily provide a
correct measure of fiscal shocks. Consider the case h = 1 and q = 2, so that
gt = εt−1 + φ2εt−2. (2A.5)
The VMA representation for (yt, gt) is:[
yt
gt
]
=
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
 1 + δφ2 0
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
+
 φ2 0
φ2 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
[
εt−2
ωt−2
]
,
(2A.6)
37Alternative ways of dealing with this issue have been proposed in the literature. Lippi
and Reichlin (1993) propose to use Blaschke matrices to "flip" the roots that are outside the
unit circle in order to recover the fundamental representation of the process of interest. Alessi,
Barigozzi, and Capasso (2011) and Forni and Gambetti (2014b) propose to augment the VAR
with information coming from factors extracted from large datasets. However, in the context of
fiscal foresight, non-fundamentalness has a clearly detectable cause, i.e., omitted information due
to the absence in the VAR of an informative measure regarding (variations concerning) future
fiscal spending moves (Lippi and Reichlin, 1993), (Beaudry and Portier, 2014). Hence, a direct,
fiscal-related way of tackling the presence of foresight appears to be desirable.
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which is non-fundamental since the roots of |A0 + A1z + A2z2| are z1 = 0 and
|z2| = φ−12 . In this case, adding the one-step-ahead forecast of gt does not solve
the problem. The VMA representation for the vector (yt, Etgt+1) is given by:[
yt
Etgt+1
]
=
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
 1 + δφ2 0
φ2 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
+
 φ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
[
εt−2
ωt−2
]
,
which is non-fundamental if |φ2| > 1.
The role of forecast revisions. Expectation revisions help solving the problem.
Consider the variable ηt = Etgt+1 − Et−1gt+1. The VMA representation for the
vector (yt, ηt) is given by:[
yt
ηt
]
=
 δ (1 + δφ2) 1
1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
 1 + δφ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
+
 φ2 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
[
εt−2
ωt−2
]
,
which is fundamental, since |A0 + A1z + A2z2| 6= 0, ∀z. It can recursively be
shown that expectations revisions of the form Etgt+1 −Et−1gt+1 help tackling the
issue of non-fundamentalness for any q > h = 1.
However, when h > 1 is unknown, even expectation revisions are not of help.
Consider for example the process:
gt = εt−2 + φ3εt−3.
This is not an unlikely case, given that typically the implementation lag for fiscal
policy decisions is longer than one quarter. The VMA representation for the vector
(yt, gt) is:
Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News From a Nonlinear World 72
[
yt
gt
]
=
[
δ2 (1 + δφ3) 1
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
[
δ (1 + δφ3) 0
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
+
[
1 + δφ3 0
1 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
[
εt−2
ωt−2
]
+
[
φ3 0
φ3 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
[
εt−3
ωt−3
]
,
and the roots of |A0 + A1z + A2z2 + A3z3| are z1,2 = 0, |z3| = φ−13 . Using expecta-
tions revisions as before is in this case uninformative, since Etgt+1−Et−1gt+1 = 0.
Knowing exactly the number of anticipation periods h would solve the problem,
since Etgt+2 − Et−1gt+2 = εt. However, h is typically unknown. To solve this
issue, Gambetti (2012a) proposes to use an alternative, more general measure of
expectations revisions, i.e., the news variable defined as:
ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) ,
with J large enough to ensure that J ≥ h. It can be shown that setting J ≥ 2 leads
to a fundamental representation associated with the vector (yt, η
g
1J), since η
g
12 = εt,
ηg13 = (1 + φ3) εt and so on. In our example, if J = 2, the VMA representation for
(yt, η
g
12) is:[
yt
ηg12
]
=
[
δ2 (1 + δφ3) 1
1 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
[
εt
ωt
]
+
[
δ (1 + δφ3) 0
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
[
εt−1
ωt−1
]
+
[
1 + δφ3 0
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
[
εt−2
ωt−2
]
+
[
φ3 0
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
[
εt−3
ωt−3
]
,
where the determinant of |A0 + A1z + A2z2 + A3z3| 6= 0, ∀z.38
38It is important to notice that, though related in spirit, Perotti (2011) variable
(Etgt − Et−1gt) + (Etgt+1 − Et−1gt+1) is uninformative in a case like this, because it does not
contain any valuable information about εt, i.e., it is equal to zero. The reason is that the forecast
horizon covered by such a variable is too short.
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In general, when the period of foresight h is unknown or uncertain, the solution
would be to include in the VAR a measure of expectations revisions taken over a
long enough horizon:
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) = ηg1J =
J∑
j=1
(Etgt+j − Et−1gt+j) =
 (1 + φ1 + ...+ φJ−h) εt if J < q(1 + φ1 + ...+ φq−h) εt if J > q
(2A.7)
(where φ0 = 0), which correctly identifies the news shock if J > h.
Estimation of the nonlinear VARs
Consider the model (9)-(12). Its log-likelihood reads as follows:39
logL = const+
1
2
T∑
t=1
log |Ωt| − 1
2
T∑
t=1
u′tΩ
−1
t ut (A1)
where the vector of residuals ut = X t− (1− F (zt−1)ΠEX t−1 − F (zt−1)ΠRX t−1.
Our goal is to estimate the following parameters Ψ = {γ,ΩR,ΩE,ΠR(L),ΠE(L)},
where Πj(L) =
[
Πj,1 ... Πj,p
]
, j ∈ {R,E} . The high-non linearity of the
model and its many parameters render its estimation with standard optimization
routines problematic. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), we employ
the procedure described below. Conditional on {γ,ΩR,ΩE}, the model is linear
in {ΠR(L),ΠE(L)}. Then, for a given guess on {γ,ΩR,ΩE}, the coefficients
{ΠR(L),ΠE(L)} can be estimated by minimizing 12
∑T
t=1 u
′
tΩ
−1
t ut. This can be
seen by re-writing the regressors as follows.
LetW t =
[
F (zt−1)Xt−1 (1− F (zt−1)Xt−1 ... F (zt−1)Xt−p 1− F (zt−1)Xt−p
]
be
the extended vector of regressors, and Π =
[
ΠR(L) ΠE(L)
]
. Then, we can
write ut = X t −ΠW ′t. Consequently, the objective function becomes
1
2
T∑
t=1
(X t −ΠW ′t)′Ω−1t (X t −ΠW ′t).
39This Section heavily draws on Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) "Appendix: Estimation
Procedure".
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It can be shown that the first order condition with respect to Π is
vecΠ′ =
(
T∑
t=1
[
Ω−1t ⊗W ′tW t
])−1
vec
(
T∑
t=1
W ′tX tΩ
−1
t
)
. (A2)
This procedure iterates over different sets of values for {γ,ΩR,ΩE}. For each set
of values, Π is obtained and the logL (A1) computed.
Given that the model is highly nonlinear in its parameters, several local optima
might be present. Hence, it is recommended to try different starting values for
{γ,ΩR,ΩE}. To ensure positive definiteness of the matrices ΩR and ΩE, we focus
on the alternative vector of parameters Ψ = {γ, chol(ΩR), chol(ΩE),ΠR(L),ΠE(L)},
where chol implements a Cholesky decomposition.
We estimate our nonlinear model by employing the Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Given
a starting value Ψ(0), the procedure constructs chains of length N of the parame-
ters of our model following these steps:
Step 1. Draw a candidate vector of parameter values Θ(n) = Ψ(n) +ψ(n) for the
chain's n + 1 state, where Ψ(n) is the current state and ψ(n) is a vector of i.i.d.
shocks drawn from N(0,ΩΨ), and ΩΨ is a diagonal matrix.
Step 2. Set the n+1 state of the chain Ψ(n+1) = Θ(n) with probabilitymin
{
1, L(Θ(n))/L(Ψ(n))
}
,
where L(Θ(n)) is the value of the likelihood function conditional on the candidate
vector of parameter values, and L(Ψ(n)) the value of the likelihood function con-
ditional on the current state of the chain. Otherwise, set Ψ(n+1) = Ψ(n).
The starting value Θ(0) is computed by working with a second-order Taylor ap-
proximation of the model (8)-(11), so that the model can be written as regressing
X t on lags ofX t,X tzt, andX tz
2
t . The residuals from this regression are employed
to fit the expression for the reduced-form time-varying variance-covariance matrix
of the VAR (see our paper) using maximum likelihood to estimate ΩR and ΩE.
Conditional on these estimates and given a calibration for γ, we can construct Ωt.
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Conditional on Ωt, we can get starting values for ΠR(L) and ΠE(L) via equation
(A2).
The initial (diagonal matrix) ΩΨ is calibrated to one percent of the parameter
values. It is then adjusted "on the fly" for the first 20,000 draws to generate an
acceptance rate close to 0.3, a typical choice for this kind of simulations (Canova,
2007). We employ N = 50, 000 draws for our estimates, and retain the last 20%
for inference.
As shown by CH, Ψ = 1
N
∑N
n=1 Ψ
(n) is a consistent estimate of Ψ under standard
regularity assumptions on maximum likelihood estimators. Moreover, the covari-
ance matrix of Ψ is given by V = 1
N
∑N
n=1(Ψ
(n) −Ψ)2 = var(Ψ(n)), that is the
variance of the estimates in the generated chain.
Generalized Impulse Response Functions
Once calibrated our VAR with the point estimates obtained via the procedure pre-
sented in the previous sub-Section, we compute the Generalized Impulse Response
Functions from our STVAR model by following the approach proposed by Koop,
Pesaran, and Potter (1996). The algorithm features the following steps.
1. Consider the entire available observations, with sample size t= 1981Q3,. . . ,2013Q1,
with T = 123, and construct the set of all possible histories Λ of length
p = 6:40 {λi ∈ Λ}. Λ will contain T − p+ 1 histories λi.
2. Separate the set of all recessionary histories from that of all expansionary
histories. For each λi calculate the transition variable zλi . If zλi ≤ z =
−0.75%, then λi ∈ ΛR, where ΛR is the set of all recessionary histories; if
zλi > −z = −0.75%, then λi ∈ ΛE, where ΛE is the set of all expansionary
histories.
40The choice p = 6 is due to the number of moving average terms (four) of our transition
variable zt, which is constructed by considering five realization of the levels of the (log-)real
GDP, i.e., four realizations of the growth rates. Moreover, such transition variable enters our
STVAR model via the transition probability F (zt−1) with one lag.
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3. Select at random one history λi from the set Λ
R. For the selected history
λi, take Ω̂λi obtained as:
Ω̂λi = F (zλi) Ω̂R + (1− F (zλi)) Ω̂E, (A3)
where Ω̂R and Ω̂E are derived from model (8)-(11) estimated over the entire
sample. zλi is the transition variable calculated for the selected history λi.
4. Cholesky-decompose the estimated variance-covariance matrix Ω̂λi :
Ω̂λi = ĈλiĈ
′
λi
(A4)
and orthogonalize the residuals to get the structural shocks:
e
(j)
λi
= Ĉ−1λi ε̂. (A5)
5. From eλi draw with replacement h four-dimensional shocks and get the vector
of bootstrapped shocks
e
(j)∗
λi
=
{
e∗λi,t, e
∗
λi,t+1
, . . . , e∗λi,t+h
}
, (A6)
where h is the horizon for the IRFs we are interested in.
6. Form another set of bootstrapped shocks which will be equal to (A6) except
for the kth shock in e
(j)∗
λi,t
which is the shock we want to perturbate (news
in our model) by an amount equal to δ. Denote the vector of bootstrapped
perturbated shocks by e
(j)δ
λi
.
7. Transform back e
(j)∗
λi
and e
(j)δ
λi
as follows:
ε̂
(j)∗
λi
= Ĉλie
(j)∗
λi
(A7)
and
ε̂
(j)δ
λi
= Ĉλie
(j)δ
λi
. (A8)
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8. Use (A7) and (A8) to generate two sequences X
(j)∗
λi
and X
(j)δ
λi
and get the
GIRF (j) (h, δ, λi).
9. Conditional on history λi, repeat for j = 1, . . . , B vectors of bootstrapped
residuals and getGIRF (1) (h, δ, λi) , GIRF
(2) (h, δ, λi) , . . . , GIRF
(B) (h, δ, λi).
Set B = 500.
10. Calculate the GIRF conditional on history λi as
ĜIRF
(i)
(h, δ, λi) = B
−1
B∑
j=1
GIRF (i,j) (h, δ, λi) . (A9)
11. Repeat all previous steps for i = 1, . . . , 500 randomly drawn histories be-
longing to the set of recessionary histories, λi ∈ ΛR.
Get ĜIRF
(1,R)
(h, δ, λ1,R) , ĜIRF
(2,R)
(h, δ, λ2,R) , . . . , ĜIRF
(500,R)
(h, δ, λ500,R),
where now the subscript R denotes explicitly that we are conditioning upon
recessionary histories.
12. Take the average and get ĜIRF
(R) (
h, δ,ΛR
)
, which is the average GIRF
under recessions.
13. Repeat all previous steps - 3 to 12 - for 500 histories belonging to the set of
all expansions and get ĜIRF
(E) (
h, δ,ΛE
)
.
14. The computation of the 90% confidence bands for our impulse responses is
undertaken by picking up, per each horizon of each state, the 5th and 95th
percentile of the densities ĜIRF
([1:500],R)
and ĜIRF
([1:500],E)
.
Further robustness checks
Our baseline analysis suggests that evidence in favor of countercyclical fiscal mul-
tipliers is borderline when we condition upon recessions vs. expansions, while it
becomes much clearer and solid when conditioning upon extreme events. The pa-
per presents the robustness checks conducted by considering a different measure
of fiscal spending news (obtained by regressing the baseline fiscal news variable on
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a constant and a number of controls), a different ordering of the variables in our
VAR, the debt/GDP ratio as an extra-variable in our VAR as well as the tran-
sition indicator, and a longer sample (an analysis that we conducted by working
with Ramey (2011b) indicator of fiscal spending news). Table 2.6 in the paper
documents the robustness of our results by collecting multipliers computed over
a 4-year horizon. Table 2A.1 in this Appendix confirms the solidity of our results
conditional on a 2-year horizon.
We then conduct a variety of robustness checks to verify the solidity of our results.
We present the robustness checks below and discuss our results by referring to
Table 2A.2, which summarizes the outcome.
FAVAR. Our baseline VAR is meant to parsimoniously model a set of key macroe-
conomic indicators crucial to quantify fiscal spending multipliers. A further reason
to prefer a parsimonious VAR is the somewhat limited number of observations
available to construct the measures of forecast revisions we deal with, as well as
the nonlinearity of our framework, in which a large number of VAR coefficients
is estimated. Despite its advantages, a parsimonious model might suffer from an
omitted-variable problem, which may bias the results of our baseline scenario. In
particular, reactions of variables like the real interest rate and the real exchange
rate may be important for the computation of the fiscal spending multipliers. In-
teractions between financial variables and real aggregates may also be at work
conditional on our fiscal news shock. We tackle this informational insufficiency
issue by adding to our VAR a factor extracted from a large dataset, so to purge
the (possibly bias-contaminated) estimated shocks. This strategy leads us to deal
with a nonlinear version of the Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model popu-
larized, in the monetary policy context, by Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
In particular, we consider a large dataset composed of 150 time-series, and ex-
tract the common factors which maximize the explained variance of such series
(a description of the series included in our dataset, their transformations, and
the computation of the factors is provided in the Appendix 2A). Following Stock
and Watson (2012) in their recent analysis on the drivers of the post-WWII U.S.
economy, we extract six common factors and then focus on the fiscal FAVAR
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Xfavart = [f
1
t , Gt, Tt, Yt, η
g
13,t]
′, where "f 1t " is the factor explaining the largest share
of variance of the series in our enlarged database. Due to the limited number of
degrees of freedom, we focus on a VAR model with two lags, a choice that we will
keep for all the five-variate VAR we estimate to check the robustness of our base-
line results.41 Results on the difference of the fiscal multiplier in different states
of the economy are collected in Table 2A.2 under the label "FAVAR".
Expectation revisions of output. Our baseline results rests on the identifying
assumption that our fiscal news variable carries valuable information regarding
fiscal shocks which may have led economic agents to revise their expectations
of future public spending. However, such revisions may have been undertaken
because of "news" about some other shocks. Suppose news about the future
evolution of technology become part of agents' information sets between time
t−1 and t. This might induce agents to revise their expectations regarding future
realizations of output. Given the link between output and public spending (due
to, e.g., automatic stabilizers), such revisions may induce agents to further revise
their expectations of future fiscal spending as well. Hence, revisions of future
fiscal spending may be triggered not only by anticipated fiscal shocks, but also by
anticipated shocks of a different nature (say, news concerning technology).
We tackle this issue by modeling the five-variate VARXYt = [η
Y
13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt, η
g
13,t]
′,
where ηY13 stands for the sum of forecast revisions regarding future real GDP.
The construction of this variable replicates the construction of ηg13 explained in
Section 2. We put ηY13 before η
g
13 in the vector to control for the effects exerted
by contemporaneous movements in ηY13 on η
g
13.
42 Notice that one can interpret
this robustness check as pointing to the role of an identified factor omitted in
the baseline analysis, i.e., the role of expectation revisions on output. Table 2A.2
collects our results under the label "ηY13".
Contemporaneous effects of ηg13 shocks. Our approach features a recur-
sive identification scheme. Our choice aims at purging the movements of the
41The entire set of results regarding our robustness checks is not documented in this paper to
save space, but it is available upon request.
42Given the choice of a Cholesky-identification scheme, the ordering of the variables before ηg13
is irrelevant for the computation of our impulse responses to a fiscal news shock.
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ηg13 fiscal variable by accounting for its systematic response to government spend-
ing, tax revenues, and output. However, such a choice has an obvious limita-
tion, i.e., output is not allowed to move immediately after the realization of the
news shock. We then perform a robustness check by focusing on the five-variate
VARXη
g
t = [η
g
13,t, η
Y
13,t, Gt, Tt, Yt]
′, which enables fiscal news shocks to move output
immediately. We keep the measure of news on output to control for the systematic
movements of fiscal news due to output news. Notice that this VAR allows for
(without forcing) an immediate response of fiscal spending G, which would how-
ever be inconsistent with the idea of a news shock. Interestingly, a look at our
GIRFs (available upon request) suggest that public spending moves in neither of
the two states. This result confirms the potential of the measure of fiscal news
shocks employed in this paper to capture anticipated fiscal shocks, i.e., shocks
which do not exert an immediate impact on public spending but, possibly, trigger
an immediate reaction of output.43 As for the difference in fiscal multipliers, the
results are presented in Table 2A.2 under "ηg13 first".
Expectation revisions of total government spending. Our baseline anal-
ysis hinges upon a ηg13, which is based on revisions of forecasts over the growth
rates of federal spending only. However, expectations concerning levels of future
fiscal spending regarding state and local expenditures are also available. We then
construct levels of expected total spending and compute the growth rates of such
expected realizations. We use this variable as a proxy of the expected growth rates
of total fiscal spending that are not readily available in the SPF dataset. We then
use this proxy as an alternative to our ηg13 variable in our vector. Our results are
collected in Table 2A.2 under the label "ηg13 total".
Ricco's news indicator. In a recent paper, Ricco (2014) shows that the news
variable we employ in our study to account for fiscal foresight may be affected
by aggregation bias. Our measure is based on forecast revisions constructed by
43Interestingly, our impulse responses suggest that output moves immediately in recessions,
while its contemporaneous response is not significant when expansions are considered (IRFs not
shown for the sake of brevity, but available upon request). The contemporaneous zero reaction of
public spending to changes in output is consistent with the evidence on the zero contemporaneous
output elasticity of government spending in the U.S. surveyed by Caldara and Kamps (2012).
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appealing to location measures (e.g., mean, median) of the distribution of the
forecasts (across forecasters). However, since the composition of the pool of re-
spondents to the SPF changes over time, one problem related with our measure
is that use of measures of central tendency might induce a non negligible bias if
the distribution of forecast revisions is skewed. The resulting aggregation bias
may in principle imply important quantitative effects for the computation of fiscal
multipliers. Ricco (2014) circumvents this problem by constructing a measure of
news based on the revisions of expectations of each individual forecaster in the
pool, whose forecast is available for at least two consecutive quarters. Ex-post
aggregation of such revisions gives rise to a "microfounded" measure of aggregate
news. Even though the correlation between the two measures of fiscal anticipation
in our sample is quite high (it reads 0.84), it is of interest to repeat our exercise
by employing Ricco's news measure as an alternative to our ηg13.
44 Results are
documented in Table 2A.2 under "ηg13 à la Ricco".
Table 2A.2 collects the figures related to the robustness checks discussed above.
Two main messages arise. First, the "Normal" scenarios generally points to a
rather fragile evidence of countercyclical fiscal multipliers. The most evident ex-
ception is the case of the news variable à la Ricco, which leads to larger multipliers
in recessions. This is in line with the fact that, in presence of a skewed distribu-
tion of forecast revisions, our measure of news would downward-bias the estimated
fiscal multipliers (see Ricco (2014) for a detailed explanation of the sources of this
bias). Second, our extreme events analysis robustly supports larger multipliers
in recessions. Hence, our results corroborate a recent statement by Blanchard
and Leigh (2013) on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and the effectiveness of
fiscal stabilization policies in periods of substantial economic slack. These results
lend support also to Parker's (2011) call for empirical models able to capture the
possible countercyclicality of fiscal multipliers.
44We thank Giovanni Ricco for providing us with his measure of fiscal news.
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Computation of the factors for the FAVAR approach
We follow Stock and Watson (2012) to estimate the factors from a large unbalanced
data set of US variables. Let X t = (X1t, . . . , Xnt)
′ denote a vector of n macroe-
conomic time series, with t = 1, . . . , T . Xit is a single time series transformed to
be stationary and to have mean zero. The dynamic factor model expresses each
of the n time series as the sum of a common component driven by r unobserved
factors F t plus an idiosyncratic disturbance term eit:
Xt = ΛFt + et (A10)
where et = (e1t, . . . , ent)
′ and Λ is the n× r matrix of factor loadings.
The factors are assumed to follow a linear and stationary vector autoregression:
Φ (L)F t = ηt (A11)
where Φ (L) is a r × r matrix of lag polynomials with the vector of r innovations
ηt. Stationarity implies that Φ (L) can be inverted and F t has the moving average
representation:
F t = Φ (L)
−1 ηt. (A12)
With n large, under the assumption that there is a single-factor structure, simple
cross-sectional averaging provides an estimate of F t good enough to treat F̂ t as
data in a regression without a generated regressor problem. With multiple factors,
Stock and Watson (2012) show that a consistent estimate of F t is obtained using
principal components.
Our data set is standard in the recent literature on factor models (see Stock and
Watson, 2012; Forni and Gambetti, 2014a). It contains an unbalanced panel of
150 quarterly series, with starting date 1947Q1 and end date 2012Q3. The data
are grouped into 12 categories: NIPA variables (31); industrial production (16);
employment and unemployment (14); housing starts (6); inventories, orders and
sales (12); prices (15); earnings and productivity (13); interest rates (10); money
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and credit (12); stock prices (5); exchange rates (7); and other (9). Earnings
and productivity data include TFP-adjusted measures of capacity utilization in-
troduced by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006). The category labeled "other"
includes expectations variables.
The transformation implemented for the series to be stationary with zero mean are
reported in Table 2A.3. The factors were estimated using principal components
as in Stock and Watson (2012). The assumption that the factors can be estimated
with no breaks over the period 1947Q2-2012Q3 is motivated by the findings of
Stock and Watson (2012), who show that the space spanned by the factors can be
estimated consistently even if there is instability in Λ.
Multipliers: "Sum" vs. "Peak" measures.
The multipliers documented in the paper are "sum" multipliers. They are com-
puted as the integral of the response of output divided by the integral of the
response of fiscal expenditure, i.e.,
∑H
h=1 Yh/
∑H
h=1 Gh, where Yh and Gh represent
the impulse responses of output and public spending respectively h-horizon after
the shock, and the ratio is then rescaled for the sample mean ratio of the lev-
els of Y over G. This measure is designed to account for the persistence of fiscal
shocks (Woodford, 2011). Another measure often employed by the literature (see
Stock and Watson, 2012; Forni and Gambetti, 2014a) is the "peak" one, which is
calculated as the peak response of output divided by the peak response of fiscal
expenditure over the first H horizons, i.e., it is equal to
maxh=1,...,H{Yh}
maxh=1,...,H{Gh} . Again,
percent changes are then converted into dollars by rescaling such a ratio by the
sample mean ratio of the levels of output over public spending.45 Tables 2A.4-2A.7
45Ramey and Zubairy (2014) warn against this practice by noticing that, in a long U.S. data
sample spanning the 1889-2011 period, the output-over-public spending ratio varies from 2 to
24 with a mean of 8. Hence, the choice of a constant value for such ratio may importantly bias
the estimation of the multipliers. In our sample, the mean value of such a ratio is 6, and it
varies from 5.39 to 6.76. Hence, the commonly adopted ex-post conversion from the estimated
elasticities to dollar increases does not appear to be an issue for our exercise. The average value
of the output-public spending ratio in our sample in 5.81 in NBER recessions, and 6.02 in NBER
expansions. Our results are robust to the employment of state-dependent output-public spending
ratios.
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extend the information contained in Tables 2.3-2.6 in the main text, and Figures
2A.1 and 2A.2 extend the one in Figures 2.5 and 2.8.
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Table 2A.1: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events. Different Scenarios.
Peak
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
η˜g13 last 0.45
[0.20,0.63]
3.37
[2.03,4.34]
1.05
[0.48,3.77]
3.15
[1.50,4.21]
η˜g13 first 1.21
[0.25,1.94]
3.05
[1.84,6.72]
2.17
[0.93,4.97]
3.64
[1.58,6.80]
Long sample (Ramey's news) 0.47
[0.19,0.80]
2.83
[1.56,5.92]
0.68
[0.23,1.56]
2.59
[1.22,6.60]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 1.79
[1.62,2.00]
1.35
[0.68,2.15]
1.95
[1.68,2.44]
2.08
[1.54,2.78]
Sum
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
η˜g13 last −0.42
[−1.56,0.13]
3.65
[2.09,4.99]
0.76
[−0.62,3.86]
3.17
[0.99,4.43]
η˜g13 first 0.76
[−1.02,2.20]
3.95
[1.59,8.72]
2.35
[0.38,5.43]
3.95
[1.27,8.17]
Long sample (Ramey's news) 0.43
[0.06,0.85]
2.49
[0.19,8.66]
0.02
[−1.77,1.08]
2.21
[−0.68,9.72]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 2.43
[2.13,2.72]
0.99
[0.36,1.77]
2.29
[1.93,2.59]
2.07
[1.43,2.54]
Notes: Two-year integral multipliers. Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs
conditional on four different sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Table 2A.2: Fiscal spending multipliers: Shares of multipliers larger in reces-
sions
Peak
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16 h = 20
Baseline Normal 87.80 90.80 90.00 90.60 90.20
Extreme 99.60 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FAV AR Normal 87.40 91.00 93.20 93.40 93.40
Extreme 100.00 99.80 99.60 99.60 99.60
ηY13 Normal 62.60 80.60 82.20 84.00 84.80
Extreme 93.00 99.20 99.40 99.20 99.20
ηg13 first Normal 81.00 86.80 88.60 90.00 90.00
Extreme 97.60 99.20 99.40 99.60 99.60
ηg13 total Normal 94.60 92.60 92.60 93.20 93.40
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 à la Ricco Normal 95.00 94.00 94.00 94.20 94.40
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.00 100.00
Sum
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16 h = 20
Baseline Normal 84.80 91.60 93.60 95.40 96.60
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FAV AR Normal 89.80 85.20 85.60 88.20 89.80
Extreme 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηY13 Normal 36.80 73.00 79.80 83.00 86.40
Extreme 86.20 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 first Normal 74.20 84.60 88.20 90.40 91.40
Extreme 96.20 99.80 100.00 100.00 100.0
ηg13 total Normal 89.80 86.60 85.40 85.80 87.00
Extreme 98.60 95.20 99.00 100.00 100.00
ηg13 à la Ricco Normal 93.00 90.80 90.60 90.20 90.40
Extreme 99.80 99.80 99.80 99.80 99.80
Notes: Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional on four different sets of
initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of
output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Table 2A.3: Time series employed for the computation of the factors
N Series Mnemonic Tr. Start End
1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal GDPC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
2 Real Gross National Product GNPC96 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
3 Real National Income NICUR/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
4 Real Disposable Income DPIC96 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
5 Real Personal Income RPI 6 1959Q1 2012Q3
6 Nonfarm Business Sector: Output OUTNFB 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
7 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 1 Decimal FINSLC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
8 Real Private Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal FPIC1 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
9 Real Private Residential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal PRFIC1 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
10 Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal PNFIC1 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
11 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 1 Decimal GPDIC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
12 Real Personal Consumption Expenditure PCECC96 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
13 Real Personal Consumption Expenditure: Nondurable Goods PCNDGC96 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
14 Real Personal Consumption Expenditure: Durable Goods PCDGCC96 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
15 Real Personal Consumption Expenditure: Services PCESVC96 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
16 Real Gross Private Saving GPSAVE/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
17 Real Federal Consumption Expenditures, Gross Investment, 1 Decimal FGCEC1 5 1995Q1 2012Q3
18 Federal Goverment: Current Expenditures, Real FGEXPND/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
19 Federal Goverment: Current Receipts, Real FGRECPT/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
20 Net Federal Government Saving FGDEF 2 1947Q1 2012Q3
21 Government Current Expenditures/GDP Deflator GEXPND/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
22 Government Current Receipts/GDP Deflator GRECPT/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
23 Government Real Expenditures minus Real Receipts GDEF 2 1947Q1 2012Q3
24 Real Government Consumption Expenditures, Gross Investment, 1 Decimal GCEC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
25 Real Change in Private Inventories, 1 Decimal CBIC1 1 1947Q1 2012Q3
26 Real Exports of Goods and Services, 1 Decimal EXPGSC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
27 Real Imports of Goods and Services, 1 Decimal IMPGSC1 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
28 Corporate Profits After Tax, Real CP/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
29 Nonfinancial Corporate Business: Profits After Tax, Real NFCPATAX/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
30 Corporate Net Cash Flow, Real CNCF/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
31 Net Corporate Dividends, Real DIVIDEND/GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
32 Industrial Production Index INDPRO 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
33 Industrial Production: Business Equipment IPBUSEQ 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
34 Industrial Production: Consumer Goods IPCONGD 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
35 Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods IPDCONGD 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
36 Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group) IPFINAL 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
37 Industrial Production: Materials IPMAT 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
38 Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods IPNCONGD 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
39 Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing MCUMFN 4 1972Q1 2012Q3
40 Industrial Production: Manufacturing IPMAN 5 1972Q1 2012Q3
41 Industrial Production: Durable Manufacturing IPDMAN 5 1972Q1 2012Q3
42 Industrial Production: Mining IPMINE 5 1972Q1 2012Q3
43 Industrial Production: Nondurable Manufacturing IPNMAN 5 1972Q1 2012Q3
44 Industrial Production: Durable Materials IPDMAT 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
45 Industrial Production: Electric and Gas Utilities IPUTIL 5 1972Q1 2012Q3
46 ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index NAPM 1 1948Q1 2012Q3
47 ISM Manufacturing: Production Index NAPMPI 1 1948Q1 2012Q3
48 Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manuf. AWHMAN 1 1948Q1 2012Q3
49 Average Weekly Overtime Hours of Prod. and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manuf. AWOTMAN 2 1948Q1 2012Q3
50 Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate CIVPART 2 1948Q1 2012Q3
Notes: Description of the Table in two pages.
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N Series Mnemonic Tr. Start End
51 Civilian Labor Force CLF160V 5 1948Q1 2012Q3
52 Civilian Employment CE160V 5 1948Q1 2012Q3
53 All Employees: Total Private Industries USPRIV 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
54 All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries USGOOD 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
55 All Employees: Service-Providing Industries SRVPRD 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
56 Unemployed UNEMPLOY 5 1948Q1 2012Q3
57 Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment UEMPMEAN 2 1948Q1 2012Q3
58 Civilian Unemployment Rate UNRATE 2 1948Q1 2012Q3
59 Index of Help-Wanted Advertising in Newspapers A0M046 1 1959Q1 2012Q3
60 HOANBS/CNP160V HOANBS/CNP160V 4 1948Q1 2012Q3
61 Initial Claims ICSA 5 1967Q3 2012Q3
62 Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Units Started HOUST 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
63 Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region HOUSTNE 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
64 Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region HOUSTMW 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
65 Housing Starts in South Census Region HOUSTS 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
66 Housing Starts in West Census Region HOUSTW 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
67 New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits PERMIT 5 1960Q1 2012Q3
68 US Manufacturers New Orders for Non Defense Capital Goods USNOIDN.D 5 1959Q2 2012Q3
69 US New Orders of Consumer Goods and Materials USCNORCGD 5 1959Q2 2012Q3
70 US ISM Manufacturers Survey: New Orders Index SADJ USNAPMNO 1 1950Q2 2012Q3
71 Retail Sales: Total (Excluding Food Services) RSXFS 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
72 Value of Manufacturers' Total Inventories for All Manufacturing Industries UMTMTI 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
73 Value of Manufacturers' Total Inventories for Durable Goods AMDMTI 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
74 Value of Manufacturers' Total Inventories for Nondurable Goods Industries AMNMTI 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
75 ISM Manufacturing: Inventories Index NAPMII 1 1948Q1 2012Q3
76 ISM Manufacturing: New Orders Index NAPMNOI 1 1948Q1 2012Q3
77 Value of Manufacturers' New Orders for Cons. Goods: Cons. Dur. Goods Ind.s ACDGNO 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
78 Manuf.s' New Orders: Durable Goods DGORDER 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
79 Value of Manuf.s' New Orders for Dur. Goods Ind.: Transp. Equipment ANAPNO 5 1992Q1 2012Q3
80 Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index GDPCTPI 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
81 Gross National Product: Chain-type Price Index GNPCTPI 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
82 Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator GDPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
83 Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deflator GNPDEF 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
84 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items CPIAUCSL 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
85 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food CPIULFSL 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
86 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Energy CPILEGSL 6 1957Q1 2012Q3
87 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food & Energy CPILFESL 6 1957Q1 2012Q3
88 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy CPIENGSL 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
89 Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food CPIUFDSL 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
90 Producer Price Index: Finished Goods: Capital Equipment PPICPE 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
91 Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing PPICRM 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
92 Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods PPIFCG 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
93 Producer Price Index: Finished Goods PPIFGS 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
94 Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate OILPRICE 6 1947Q1 2012Q3
95 Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons HOANBS 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
96 Nonfarm Business Secotr: Output Per Hour of All Persons OPHNFB 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
97 Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Nonlabor Payments UNLPNBS 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
98 Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost ULCNFB 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
99 Compensation of Employees: Wages and Salary Accruals, Real WASCUR/CPI 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
100 Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour COMPNFB 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
Notes: Table 2A.3 (continued). Time series employed for the computation of the factors. De-
scription of the Table in the following page.
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N Series Mnemonic Tr. Start End
101 Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour COMPRNFB 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
102 Growth in utilization-adjusted TFP dtfp_util 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
103 Growth in business sector TFP dtfp 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
104 Utilization in producing investment du_invest 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
105 Utilization in producing non-investment business output du_consumption 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
106 Utilization-adjusted TFP in producing equipment and consumer durables dtfp_I_util 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
107 Utilization-adjusted TFP in producing non-equipment output dtfp_C_util 1 1947Q2 2012Q3
108 Effective Federal Funds Rate FEDFUNDS 2 1954Q3 2012Q3
109 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate TB3MS 2 1947Q1 2012Q3
110 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate GS1 2 1953Q2 2012Q3
111 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate GS10 2 1953Q2 2012Q3
112 Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield AAA 2 1947Q1 2012Q3
113 Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield BAA 2 1947Q1 2012Q3
114 Bank Prime Loan Rate MPRIME 2 1949Q1 2012Q3
115 GS10-FEDFUNDS Spread GS10-FEDFUNDS 1 1954Q3 2012Q3
116 GS1-FEDFUNDS Spread GS1-FEDFUNDS 1 1954Q3 2012Q3
117 BAA-FEDFUNDS Spread BAA-FEDFUNDS 1 1954Q3 2012Q3
118 Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions BOGNONBR 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
119 Board of Gov. Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve Requirements TRARR 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
120 Board of Gov. Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve Requirements BOGAMBSL 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
121 M1 Money Stock M1SL 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
122 M2 Less Small Time Deposits M2MSL 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
123 M2 Money Stock M2SL 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
124 Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks BUSLOANS 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
125 Consumer Loans at All Commercial Banks CONSUMER 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
126 Bank Credit at All Commercial Banks LOANINV 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
127 Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks REALLN 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
128 Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding TOTALSL 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
129 St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base AMBSL (CHNG) 5 1947Q1 2012Q3
130 US Dow Jones Industrials Share Price Index (EP) USSHRPRCF 5 1950Q2 2012Q3
131 US Standard & Poor's Index of 500 Common Stocks US500STK 5 1950Q2 2012Q3
132 US Share Price Index NADJ USI62...F 5 1957Q2 2012Q3
133 Dow Jones/GDP Deflator DOW Jones/GDPDEF 5 1950Q2 2012Q3
134 S&P/GDP Deflator S&P/GDPDEF 5 1950Q2 2012Q3
135 Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies TWEXMMTH 2 1973Q1 2012Q3
136 Euro/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXUSEU(-1) 5 1999Q1 2012Q3
137 Germany/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXGEUS 5 1971Q1 2001Q4
138 Switzerland/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXSZUS 5 1971Q1 2012Q3
139 Japan/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXJPUS 5 1971Q1 2012Q3
140 U.K./U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXUSUK(-1) 5 1971Q1 2012Q3
141 Canada/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate EXCAUS 5 1971Q1 2012Q3
142 US The Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index SADJ USCYLEADQ 5 1959Q1 2012Q3
143 US Economic Cycle Research Institute Weekly Leading Index USECRIWLH 5 1950Q2 2012Q3
144 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: Personal Finances, Current USUMPFNCH 2 1978Q1 2012Q3
145 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: Personal Finances, Expected USUMPFNEH 2 1978Q1 2012Q3
146 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: Economic Outlook, 12 Months USUMECO1H 2 1978Q1 2012Q3
147 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: Economic Outlook, 5 Years USUMECO5H 2 1978Q1 2012Q3
148 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: Buying Conditions, Durables USUMBUYDH 2 1978Q1 2012Q3
149 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index USUMCONSH 2 1991Q1 2012Q3
150 University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment - Current Conditions USUMCNSUR 2 1991Q1 2012Q3
Notes: Table 2A.3 (continued). Time series employed for the computation of the factors. Clas-
sification of the series: 1-31: "NIPA"; 32-47: "Industrial Production"; 48-61: "Employment
and Unemployment"; 62-67: "Housing Starts"; 68-79: "Inventories", "Orders and Sales"; 80-94:
"Prices"; 95-107: "Earnings and Productivity"; 108-117: "Interest Rates"; 118-129: "Money and
Credit"; 130-134: "Stock Prices"; 135-141: "Exchange Rates"; 142-150: "Others". The column
labeled "Tr." indicates the transformation applied to the series (1 = level, 2 = first difference,
3 = logarithm, 4 = second difference, 5 = first difference of logarithm, 6 = second difference of
logarithm). Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' website.
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Table 2A.4: Fiscal spending multipliers
Peak Sum
Horizon/State Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
4 1.68
[1.12,3.49]
3.38
[1.77,4.70]
1.73
[0.52,3.50]
3.15
[1.71,4.27]
8 1.24
[0.80,3.19]
3.32
[1.55,4.91]
0.33
[−1.05,2.77]
3.05
[0.68,4.70]
12 1.11
[0.74,2.69]
2.77
[1.40,4.28]
−0.57
[−2.24,1.54]
2.13
[0.13,3.82]
16 1.09
[0.71,2.43]
2.60
[1.38,3.96]
−1.41
[−3.96,0.74]
1.54
[−0.42,2.95]
20 1.09
[0.71,2.41]
2.58
[1.38,3.90]
−2.27
[−6.23,−0.01]
1.00
[−0.94,2.47]
Notes: Figures conditional on our baseline VAR analysis. Log-values of the impulse response
of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
Table 2A.5: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events
Peak
Hor./State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
4 1.24
[0.78,1.88]
3.57
[2.14,4.73]
1.68
[1.15,3.44]
3.23
[1.74,4.69]
8 0.86
[0.53,1.25]
3.58
[1.94,4.75]
1.24
[0.82,3.16]
3.24
[1.56,4.72]
12 0.79
[0.48,1.10]
2.39
[1.48,3.30]
1.11
[0.75,2.56]
2.88
[1.32,4.20]
16 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
20 0.79
[0.43,1.08]
2.24
[1.44,2.90]
1.09
[0.72,2.29]
2.71
[1.31,3.94]
Sum
Hor./State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
4 1.03
[−0.51,2.03]
3.42
[2.05,4.35]
1.69
[0.64,3.40]
3.09
[1.71,4.14]
8 −0.26
[−2.01,0.84]
3.42
[1.22,5.14]
0.30
[−0.87,2.83]
2.94
[0.56,4.46]
12 −1.32
[−3.68,−0.03]
2.21
[0.61,3.54]
−0.62
[−2.15,1.48]
2.06
[0.03,3.78]
16 −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
20 −3.28
[−7.00,−1.56]
1.09
[−0.31,2.07]
−2.37
[−6.08,0.01]
0.83
[−0.97,2.54]
Notes: Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional on four different sets of
initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of
output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Table 2A.6: Fiscal spending multipliers: Shares of multipliers larger in reces-
sions
Peak
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 87.8 90.8 90.0 90.6 90.2
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 last Normal 84.0 87.0 87.8 88.8 89.2
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 first Normal 69.0 76.2 76.8 79.8 80.6
Extreme 86.4 96.4 96.2 96.0 96.0
Long sample (Ramey's news) Normal 96.8 98.2 98.0 98.0 98.0
Extreme 99.0 100 100 100 100
Sum
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 84.8 91.6 93.6 95.4 96.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 last Normal 78.2 86.4 89.4 90.6 92.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
η˜g13 first Normal 58.2 76.2 82.2 89.8 92.0
Extreme 71.6 93.0 97.8 98.8 99.2
Long sample (Ramey's news) Normal 82.8 89.6 87.6 86.4 86.6
Extreme 90.2 92.8 92.8 93.0 93.6
Notes: Normal scenarios- Fraction of multipliers which are larger in recessions than expansions
out of 500 draws from their empirical distributions. Extreme scenarios- Fraction of multipliers
which are larger in deep recessions than strong expansions out of 500 draws from their empirical
distributions. 'h' identifies the number of quarters after the shock.
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Table 2A.7: Fiscal spending multipliers: Extreme events. Different Scenarios
Peak
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline 0.79
[0.45,1.09]
2.27
[1.45,2.93]
1.09
[0.72,2.31]
2.72
[1.32,3.96]
η˜g13 last 0.43
[0.19,0.61]
2.55
[1.66,3.34]
0.97
[0.45,3.01]
2.88
[1.44,3.72]
η˜g13 first 1.14
[0.24,1.82]
2.74
[1.65,4.48]
1.91
[0.85,3.72]
3.23
[1.51,5.14]
Long sample (Ramey's news) 0.49
[0.20,0.81]
2.61
[1.55,4.62]
0.77
[0.28,1.50]
2.51
[1.21,5.31]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 1.35
[1.15,1.54]
1.22
[0.58,1.81]
1.56
[1.31,2.00]
1.66
[1.24,2.55]
Sum
Scenario/State Strong exp. Deep rec. Weak exp. Mild rec.
Baseline −2.26
[−5.63,−0.78]
1.60
[0.18,2.63]
−1.40
[−3.91,0.65]
1.38
[−0.48,3.02]
η˜g13 last −1.57
[−2.92,−0.91]
2.28
[1.23,3.10]
−0.44
[−1.97,2.29]
2.16
[0.22,3.00]
η˜g13 first −0.70
[−2.50,0.43]
2.36
[0.99,4.29]
0.66
[−1.04,2.90]
2.50
[0.59,4.39]
Long sample (Ramey's news) 0.15
[−0.24,0.53]
1.74
[0.08,3.92]
0.07
[−1.23,0.96]
1.52
[0.60,4.62]
High debt Mod.+ debt Mod.− debt Low debt
Debt/GDP ratio 0.68
[0.15,1.37]
0.74
[−1.02,1.15]
1.33
[0.95,1.66]
1.33
[0.81,1.97]
Notes: Four-year integral multipliers. Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs
conditional on four different sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of
output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Chapter 3
Opening the Red Budget Box: Real
Effects of a Tax Shock in the UK
Abstract
This paper studies the real effects of an exogenous UK tax change in recessions
and expansions. The tax shock is identified via the measure recently proposed by
Cloyne (2013). Combining local projection techniques (Jordá, 2005) with smooth
transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994), tax policy shock is found
to affect UK macroeconomic variables depending on the phase of business cycle
the economy is when tax shock occurs. A positive tax shock in recessions triggers
a large, persistent, negative, and statistically significant reaction in output, con-
sumption, investment, imports and government consumption. The results suggest
that output tax multipliers are negative and above one (in absolute value) in re-
cessions but not in expansions. The size and the sign of responses of a number of
macroeconomic variables are also found to be state-contingent.
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3.1 Introduction
Each year in Spring, the UK Chancellor of Exchequer puts the Budget Statement
in a red bag, the red budget box, and carries it from 11 Downing Street to the
House of Commons to read the Financial Statement and Government's proposals
for change in taxation. Suppose the Chancellor proposes an unexpected increase
in taxes, then the following questions arise: What are the effects of tax changes
on output? Are tax shock effects different in recessions and in expansions? How
large are tax multipliers in the UK?
This paper studies the heterogeneous impact of tax shocks in the UK in recessions
and expansions. We show that unexpected tax changes exert different effects on
a number of macroeconomic variables depending on the phase of business cycle
the economy is in when the tax change occurs. Disentangling the (non-linear)
effects of taxes on the GDP components (consumption, investment, imports, ex-
ports, and government consumption), we highlight which variable drives the GDP
reaction in recessions and expansions. We quantify tax multipliers on output and
its components in "good" and "bad" times.
We find that the reaction of several variables is asymmetric along the business
cycle. In particular, the position in the business cycle when the shock occurs
statistically affects the sign and the size of tax multipliers on real variables. In
recessions, tax multipliers are negative and above one (in absolute value) on con-
sumption, investments, exports, imports, and output but below one on govern-
ment consumption. In expansions, tax multipliers are estimated to be negative
and above one (in absolute value) on investments but positive and above one on
exports, imports, and government consumption. Multipliers are found statistically
different across regimes. We show that the effects of tax shocks are quantitatively
larger in recessions and smaller in expansions than those predicted by a linear
framework.
These results support the empirical evidences that tax policy changes may generate
different outcomes according to the macroeconomic conditions. Tagkalakis (2008),
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analysing a panel of nineteen OECD countries, finds that the effects of tax shocks
on private consumption are different in recessions and expansions. This asymmetry
can be explained by liquidity constraints of households that can be more severe in
recessions than in expansions. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) emphasise that during
the "Great Recession" the size of fiscal multipliers have been underestimated. This
suggests that fiscal multipliers may vary over time.
Despite the importance to evaluate whether the effects of a tax shock is asymmetric
across the business cycle (i.e., in recessions and in expansions), the literature
focusing on the non-linear effects of tax change is scant. Indeed, it focuses on
the linear effects of a tax shock on output on a single country (i.e., Pereira and
Wemans, 2013; Hayo and Uhl, 2014; Cloyne, 2013), and particularly on the US
economy (i.e., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer
and Romer, 2010; Favero and Giavazzi, 2012; Perotti, 2012; Mertens and Ravn,
2014), whereas a few studies have focused on a cross-country panel datasets (see
e.g., Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori, 2011) or on multi-country analysis (i.e.,
Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo, 2012). As for the literature dealing with non-
linear effects of UK tax shocks, one exception is Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and
Weber (2012) which estimate the effects of a tax shock on output relying on a
Threshold VAR. They find that the output tax multiplier is very small and not
statistically significant. It means that whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer
proposes a cut or an increase in taxes, his proposal is unlikely to stimulate or
dampen the economic activity, whatever are the economic conditions.1
Two issues make our aim challenging. Firstly, the identification of tax changes
because of the endogeneity problem between tax revenues and GDP. For instance,
tax revenues shocks might trigger output fluctuations, while shocks affecting out-
put might cause revenue fluctuations. To overcome the endogeneity problem, two
main approaches have been proposed in the empirical literature. The first one,
pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), relies on structural vector autoregres-
sive (SVAR) analysis in which cyclically adjusted tax revenues are used to proxy
1Afonso, Baxa, and Slavik (2011) study the nonlinear effects of a fiscal policy in Germany,
Italy, the UK, and the US. However, using the debt ratio as a proxy for fiscal policy shock, they
do not distinguish between revenues and government spending shock.
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tax shocks, and it is based on some assumptions about the implementation lags
in fiscal policymaking and on the calibration of the fiscal elasticity.2 The second
one, the narrative approach proposed by Romer and Romer (2010), identifies an
unexpected tax change analysing written official records and distinguishing tax
shocks due to reasons not related to countercyclical concerns (exogenous) from
those related to them (endogenous).3 Several concerns arise from the identifi-
cation of tax shocks á la Blanchard and Perotti (2002), because it may fail to
capture tax shifts that are exogenous. For instance, Romer and Romer (2010)
argue that other non-policy movement (i.e., asset and commodity price fluctua-
tion) may affect the cyclically-adjusted revenues and a SVAR may not to address
the correlations between these factors. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) claim
that the effects of tax shocks on output may be very sensitive to the calibrated
elasticity. Furthermore, Caldara and Kamps (2012) find that the calibrated elas-
ticity may bias downward the effects of such shock on output. Secondly, Ramey
and Zubairy (2014) raise another issue that may be behind biased results for the
fiscal multipliers in SVAR analysis. The estimated size of fiscal multipliers may
be very sensitive to the value of ex post conversion factor, i.e. the ratio of the
GDP/fiscal variables, used to convert elasticity into multiplier when the model is
estimated including logarithm transformed variables.4
Our analysis jointly tackles these two issues. We estimate a (linear) Structural
VARs identifying the structural tax shock á la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We
2In the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach a change in tax revenues depend on the
automatic response of taxes to output and on exogenous tax changes. To purge the tax revenues
from automatic stabilizers, they calibrate the elasticity of taxes to output via the OECD method
and assumptions proposed by Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995) and
van den Noord (2002). The elasticity of taxes to output is calibrated combining the estimation
of elasticity of tax revenues to their tax base with the elasticity of tax base to output. The tax
revenues purged by its automatic response to output are the cyclically-adjusted measure of tax
revenues. Then, the calibrated elasticity is used to pin down the relations linking the reduced
form residual to the structural shock in a SVAR framework. The identification of structural
shocks is recovered relying on some assumptions about the implementation lags.
3This method has been advocated to identify government spending shocks (see e.g., Ramey
and Shapiro, 1998; Ramey, 2011), fiscal consolidations (see e.g., Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and
Pescatori, 2011; Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori, 2011), tax shocks in the US (Romer and Romer,
2010), in Portugal (Pereira and Wemans, 2013), in Germany (Hayo and Uhl, 2014), and in the
UK (Cloyne, 2013).
4The transformation of variables in logarithm form is a common practice in the VAR liter-
ature, but not only. Indeed, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a) relying on Local Projection
regressions use log-transformed variables.
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set the elasticity of taxes to output borrowing two coefficient restriction's values
proposed by Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013), 0.76 and 1.61, respectively. Then,
we convert elasticities into multipliers using different ex post conversion factors.
The results suggest that tax multipliers increase in the value of coefficient restric-
tions (i.e., lower when the coefficient restriction is set to 0.76 and higher when it is
equal to 1.61). This result for the UK is in line with the one found by Caldara and
Kamps (2008) for the US. They highlight that the effects of tax shock will be biased
downward whether the calibrated elasticity is too small. Moreover, estimating two
different sample sizes (1963:I-2001:II and 1955:I-2009:IV), we find that increasing
the value of the coefficient restriction affects the persistence of tax shocks. Fur-
thermore, the combination of identifying tax shock via coefficient restrictions with
ex post conversion factors may lead to another bias on tax multiplier estimates
(see Appendix 3A for details).
To overcome the tax shock identification problem discussed above, we identify the
UK tax shocks using the measure constructed by narrative-approach and proposed
by Cloyne (2013), whereas to avoid the ex post conversion factor one we define
the variables as in Hall (2009) and in Barro and Redlick (2011). To estimate the
effects of tax shocks conditionally on the state of economy and to avoid dealing with
some implicit assumptions of the regime-switching model, we combine the Local
Projection (Jordá, 2005) estimations with smooth transition regressions (Granger
and Teräsvirta, 1994).5
Our main results show that the impact of tax shocks on the macroeconomic vari-
ables is asymmetric over the business cycle. Researchers disagree over the (linear)
effects of a tax shock in the UK. For instance, Perotti (2005), relying on the
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach, finds that a positive tax shock has expan-
sionary effects on output, opposite to the conventional wisdom. Cloyne (2013),
identifying the tax shock à la Romer and Romer (2010), finds opposite results: an
unexpected increase in taxes has negative and statistically significant effects on
5 The use of single-equation technique in a non-linear framework has been also advocated
by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2014), Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013),
Ramey and Zubairy (2014), Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014), Leduc and Wilson (2003) and others
as an simple alternative to the VARs.
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output (-0.5 and -2.15 over three years). We reconcile these differences considering
the phase of the economy in which tax shock occurs. The difference of the results
across regimes (recessions and expansion) lies on the relative position of the AD-
AS curves. To rationalise these results we consider an AS curve which is relatively
flat before the point of full employment level of national income, and then it be-
comes almost vertical afterwards. In expansions, the aggregate demand curve is
in the steeper part of the aggregate supply curve and the effects of tax shocks on
output are small. Conversely, in recessions the aggregate demand curve is in the
flatter part of the aggregate supply curve, and therefore the variation of output to
taxes is greater in recessions than in expansions. We show that the effects of such
shocks are quantitatively different than those predicted by a linear framework. A
linear estimation overshadows the effects of tax shocks across regimes because it
works as an average of the two different effects. Our results are important for a
policy standpoint, calling for a tailored use of fiscal policy instruments across the
business cycle.
A battery of robustness checks, dealing with alternative specification of tax shocks
and different specifications of baseline regressions, confirms the asymmetric effects
of a tax shock on GDP and its components.
Our paper is close to Cloyne (2013) and Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber
(2012). There are differences between theirs contributions and ours. First, Cloyne
(2013) studies the effects of tax shocks on key macroeconomic variables via a linear
VAR, and identifying such shocks through the narrative approach. Conversely, we
investigate the impact of tax shocks conditionally on the phase of the business cycle
the economy is when tax shocks occurs. Second, Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and
Weber (2012) study the effects of tax shocks in a non-linear VAR and identifying
the structural shock á la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Differently, we identify the
tax shocks via the narrative measure proposed by Cloyne (2013), and to estimate
the effects of tax shocks on output, but also on its components, we rely on a
non-linear version of the Local Projection (Jordá, 2005) technique.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the linear
Local Projection exercise and relative results. Section 3 extends the previous
section focusing on a nonlinear framework. Section 4 provides some robustness
checks, whereas section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data definition and Local Projection specifica-
tion
We estimate the effects of a tax shock on UK macroeconomic aggregates relying
on the Local Projection (LP) technique introduced by Jordá (2005). LP allows
to project the value of the dependent variable shifted h periods ahead on the
information set available at time t. Thus, those projections are local to each
horizon.
Consider a h set of regressions for h = 0,1,2. . .H for each variable of interest,
X˜t+h, such as output, consumption, investment, imports, exports and government
consumption:
X˜t+h = αh + ζh +BLh(L)yt−i + θLh
Cloyne
t + ut+h (3.1)
where α and ζ are the constant and the linear trend, BLh is the coefficient matrix
at each horizon h and yt−i is the vector of control variables which include i lags of
variables that usually enter in a "fiscal" VAR, such as the log real per-capita terms
of the government spending, GDP and tax revenues. To avoid degree of freedom
constraints due to lag length and dimension of covariate vector on the maximum
horizon h (Jordá, 2005), we opt for a parsimonious specification of yt−i which in-
cludes four lags for each variables, as in (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013a).6
The tax shock variable (Cloynet ) in equation (3.1) is the new tax change measure
proposed by Cloyne (2013). It is constructed via the narrative approach proposed
6This lag specification is quite standard in the VARs estimated on quarterly data.
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by Romer and Romer (2010) and allows to separate exogenous components of tax
changes from the endogenous ones (i.e., tax policy change not due to countercycli-
cal concern versus these due as response to the macroeconomic fluctuations). In
particular, Cloyne's tax shock measure includes four categories of exogenous tax
changes.7 Firstly, it includes "long-run" economic reforms not aimed at offset-
ting macroeconomic fluctuations. The second component is the "ideological" tax
changes adopted for political reasons, whereas the third one refers to the "external
change" (for example, imposed from a court judgments or European directives).
The fourth component is the "deficit consolidation" not driven by current move-
ment in deficit or as consequence of other macroeconomic shock but, for example,
to anchor Government's credibility. The series is aggregated according the im-
plementation date to avoid contemporaneous endogeneity of tax revenue to GDP.
The changes in revenues are normalized by the GDP and expressed as percentage.
Then, a change in Cloyne's measure will reflect the forecast "full year" change
in revenues in each quarter. The fact of having an estimate of the unanticipated
fiscal shock enables us to employ a uniequational approach to compute dynamic
responses of a given macroeconomic variable of interest. In other words, we need
not appeal to a VAR framework to identify the effects of an exogenous variations
in taxes. The advantage of the uniequational approach is that it is less prone to
model misspecification, hence  all else being equal - it reduces the risk of pro-
ducing biased impulse responses. For further discussions on this approach, see
Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2014).8 The effects of a tax change (Cloynet ) on
each variables of interest (X˜t+h) are captured by parameter θLh in equation (3.1)
which, also, depicts the contemporaneous effect of an exogenous tax shock on the
7The source for revenue estimates are the Financial Statement and Budget report and the
official parliamentary record
8Different model specifications have been proposed in the tax literature. For instance, Romer
and Romer (2010) regress the dependent variable (GDP) on the contemporaneous value and
12 lags of their tax measure. Cloyne (2013) includes 12 lags of his tax measure, as in Romer
and Romer (2010), but in an "augmented" VAR which includes the consumption, investment
and GDP equations, as in Mertens and Ravn (2014). Favero and Giavazzi (2012) include only
the contemporaneous value of the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shock in a VAR which models,
among variables, also the revenues one. Our specification is very close to the one in Favero
and Giavazzi (2012). However, we address the issue of different lag length of tax shocks to be
included in our specification in the robustness check section.
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UK macroeconomic aggregates. Thus, the IRFs are constructed as a sequence of
estimated {θLh}20h=0.
The main advantage of this methodology for the tax multiplier estimations is that
it does not require that the left-hand side variables in equation (3.1) should be
specified in the same form as the right-hand side variables. This property allows
to define each dependent variable of interest X˜t+h as in Hall (2009), Barro and
Redlick (2011) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). In particular, X˜t+h is
defined as following:
X˜t+h ≈ (lnXt+h − lnXt−1) Xt−1
GDP t−1
(3.2)
where (lnXt+h − lnXt−1) refers to the accumulated change from time t-1 to t+h,
whereas the ratio Xt−1/GDP t−1 converts ex ante the percent change to pound
change at each point on time, as in Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). Thus,
this specification overcomes the problem of ex post conversion factors, and avoid
bias in the estimation of tax multipliers. According to Hall (2009), if the dependent
variable is divided by the same denominator as the independent one, the definition
of multipliers is preserved. Notice that the Cloyne tax shock measure is normalized
by the GDP. The dependent variables are transformed according to equation (3.2).
Thus, the dependent variables (X˜t+h) and the tax measure (
Cloyne
t ) are divided by
the same denominator. Hence, the coefficient θLh of equation (3.1) captures the
contemporaneous tax multiplier of each variable of interest X˜t+h at each horizon
h, useful to evaluate strictly temporary tax changes.
Jordà's method implies the serial correlation in the error terms. To account for
it, we computed confidence intervals relying on the (circular) block bootstrap
(Politis and Romano, 1992). We estimate equation (3.2) using quarterly data from
1955Q1-2009Q4. The beginning of the period is motivated by the availability of
the quarterly data, whereas the end by the exogenous tax change measure. Table
3.1 summarizes the variables used and their sources.
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3.2.1 (Linear) Results
We look at the effects of tax shock on GDP, before turning to the analysis of
tax multipliers on GDP components. Figure 3.1 displays the impulse response
of output following a 1% percent of GDP increase in taxes. The blue line de-
notes the sequence of the estimated θLh coefficients,
9 whereas the dark and light
shaded bands refer to the 68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. How-
ever, throughout the paper, we define as statistically significant those estimates
for which 90% confidence intervals do not include the zero line.
An exogenous tax increase has a negative, statistically significant, and persistent
effect on output. The GDP decreases on impact by −0.5% and troughs at −1.8%,
17 quarters after the initial shock, then slowly goes back to its steady state.
Which components of GDP drive the response of output? To answer this ques-
tion, we transform each component of the GDP, such as private consumption,
investment, exports, imports and government consumption according to equation
(3.2), and we run h equations for each dependent variables of interest. Figure
3.2 depicts the reaction of each GDP component to a tax shock. The impulse
responses can be interpreted as deviations from the baseline and expressed as per-
cent change of GDP. The private consumption decreases on impact by −0.62%
hitting a trough of −2%, one quarter before the GDP. This reaction is statistically
significant, negative and persistent for all the h horizons considered. Afterwards,
consumption gradually returns to its steady-state. The investment (gross fixed
capital formation) reaction is statistically significant for the first 8 quarters after
the shock occurs. It decreases on impact by a small amount (−0.1%) and hits the
trough (−0.5%) in the 4th quarter. Tax shock does not affect exports in the short-
run, whereas it has a negative and persistent effects on imports. The reaction of
imports mimics the shape of the consumption and output one, albeit quantita-
tively smaller than those. Indeed, the imports decrease on impact by −0.14%
and reach a trough of −0.64% (the 8th quarter), then gradually and go back to
9The transformation of the dependent variables as in Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick
(2011), and the construction of IRFs are a sequence of {θLh}20h=0 imply that the contemporaneous
tax multipliers on each variable of interest and at each horizon h can be read directly from IRFs.
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the steady-state. Also, our estimations predict a positive reaction of government
consumption, albeit small.
How large are the cumulative tax multipliers in the UK? The cumulative multipli-
ers are useful not only to capture short-run effects but also permanent tax shock
effects. The cumulative tax multipliers from one to five years are computed as the
ratio of the cumulative change in the variable X˜t+h to the the cumulative change
in tax revenues, in response of an unanticipated tax shocks identified by Cloynet .
10 In order to obtain the estimated θLh coefficients of the variable in denominator
(tax revenues), we transform the revenues series as in (3.2), plug it in equation
3.2, and we run h equations. After having obtained the estimated θLh coefficients
for the tax revenues equation, we divide the sum of bootstrapped θLh coefficients
until horizon H of each variable of interest to the counterpart bootstrapped θLh
coefficients of the tax revenues' equations. Table 3.2 shows the median cumula-
tive tax multipliers. Bold numbers refer to tax multipliers statistically significant
at the 90% level. Results show that the cumulative output tax multipliers range
between −0.46 (1-year tax multiplier) and −2 (5-year tax multiplier).
Turning to the tax multipliers on the GDP components, the tax shock has a big-
ger effect on the private consumption with multipliers estimated between −1.56
and −2.24, whereas these on investment are lower and more stable than the ones
on consumption (from −0.5 to −1). The tax multipliers on imports are negative
and statistically significant overall the periods, ranging from -1 (1 year cumulative
multiplier) to -0.75 (5 year cumulative multiplier). Turning to the government con-
sumption multipliers, a tax shock increases the government consumption around
0.5, albeit very small.
Comparing our result to the literature, Perotti (2005) finds that a tax cut has a
contractionary effect on output over the 20 quarters. Focusing on the early part of
his sample he finds that the 1-year and 3-year cumulative output tax multipliers
are equal to 0.2, whereas those become negative (−0.4 and −0.7, respectively)
10The cumulative multipliers are computed as
∑H
h=1∆X˜t+h∑H
h=1∆
˜Revenuest+h
for H=4,8,12,16,20, where
∆X˜t+h ≡ X˜t+h − X˜t−1.
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when he focuses on the late part of the sample.11 Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo
(2012), relying on the coefficient restriction method á la Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), estimate that a tax cut generates on impact a positive GDP multiplier
(0.12) and negative (−0.12) at the 8th quarter, but not statistically significant.
Conversely, the HR Treasury (2003) reports that a tax cut generate an 1-year
cumulative output tax multiplier of 0.4, positive and statistically significant albeit
very small. According to Cloyne (2013), a tax increase has a recessionary effect
on output that decreases on impact by −0.6 up to −2.15, 10-12 quarters after the
initial shock. Our response of GDP to a tax shock is quantitatively in line with
the Cloyne's one (2013).
Overall, our results are in line with the Keynesian theory. A tighter fiscal policy
negatively affects aggregate demand as disposable income and private consumption
decrease. Households decrease their demand for both domestic and foreign goods,
firms decrease investment, whereas government consumption increases.
3.3 The Non linear Model
Do tax multipliers change according to the state of the economy? Following Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2014) we study the non-linear effect of a
fiscal shock on variables of interest combining the LPs (Jordá, 2005) with smooth
transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994). The response of dependent
variables X˜t+1 to a tax shock is estimated by the following regression:
X˜t+h = F (zt−i)(BR,h(L)yt−i + θR,h
Cloyne
t ) + (1− F (zt−i))(BE,h(L)yt−i + θE,hCloynet ) + ut+h
(3.3)
where R stands for Recession and E for Expansion. We estimate the equation
(3.3) including a constant and a linear trend. Each variable of interest X˜t+1 is
11As Perotti (2005) noted, he finds such contractionary effects on GDP for these countries
(UK, Australia, Germany) for which he estimated the smallest output elasticity of net taxes.
This highlights that the latter may have been underestimated.
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projected on the same vector of covariates yt−i of the linear specification, and
BR,h and BE,h refer to coefficient matrices of the recessionary and expansionary
phase, respectively. The lagged variables in yt−i are used to control for the history
of the shock, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a). The effect of a tax shock
on X˜t+h at horizon h is captured in recessions by θR,h, whereas in expansions by
θE,h.
As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a; 2013b; 2014), the transition of X˜t+1
from one regime to another is governed by a logistic function that depends on zt:
F (zt) =
exp(−γzt)
1 + exp(−γzt) , γ > 0, zt ∼ N(0, 1) (3.4)
The transition function in (3.4) is a monotonically increasing function of zt, where
F is a continuous transition function bounded between zero and one and zt is
the transition variable. The slope parameter γ determines the smoothness of
the change between zero (strong expansions) to one (strong recessions), and the
identification restriction is that γ > 0. If γ → ∞ in (3.4), then equation (3.3)
becomes a two-regime switching regression model.
Before estimating equation (3.3) for each variable of interest X˜t+h, we formally
test for the presence of nonlinearities. Linearity is tested replacing the transition
variable F (zt−i) by the third order Taylor series approximation around γ = 0, as
suggested by Lukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988).
We test linearity as following:
Xt = wtβ
′
0 + (w˜tzt−i)
′β1 + (w˜tz2t−i)
′β2 + (w˜tz3t−i)
′β3 + ut (3.5)
where vector wt contains four lags of covariates (log-real GDP, government spend-
ing, revenues) and the contemporaneous value of tax shock (Cloynet ). Testing the
null hypothesis of linearity versus nonlinearity is equivalent to perform an LM (χ2)
test of H
′
0 : βι = 0, ι= 1, 2, 3, against H
′
1: at least one βι 6= 0. We perform the
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linearity test plugging in Xt each variable of interest and in zt−i each potential
transition variable, such as the lagged (t-i) standardized backward-looking mov-
ing average (MA) over (j) quarter(s) of the output growth rate with i ∈ I = 1, .., 5
and j ∈ J = 2, ...8. The choice of i is justified to avoid that tax shocks may
have some contemporaneous feedback on the state of economy. Notice that all
the transition variable candidates have been standardized in order to be compara-
ble. Table 3.3 reports the p-value (multiplied by 100) of linearity tests. The tests
suggest a clear rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity. We choose for each
variable of interest the transition variables MA(j) lagged at time t-i correspond-
ing to the smallest p-value (Teräsvirta, 1988). That because whether there is a
correct transition variable among the different alternatives, the power of the test
is maximized against it. Table 3.3 highlights that the nonlinearity of the GDP,
consumption, investment, exports is governed by a MA(2) lagged at t-1, whereas
that one of import and government consumption by a MA(2) lagged at time t-5.
Then, we calibrate the smoothing parameters γ in order to match the probability
of being in recession obtained applying the BBQ algorithm on the logarithm of
the real GDP (more details in the Appendix 3B). We define a recessionary regime
a period for which F (zt) ≥ 0.85 ≈ 0.15. It means that the economy spends about
15% of the time in the recessionary state and 85% of the time in the expansionary
one.12 This implies setting γ = 1.7. Figure 3.3 plots Cloyne's tax change mea-
sure versus the recessionary (shaded area) and expansionary phases,13 whereas
figures 3.4 and 3.5 refer to the transition variable zt and transition function F (zt),
respectively.14
Notice that one important advantage of the LPs is that the impulse responses
incorporate the average transitions of the economy from one regime to another.
12The values of γ are in line with estimates obtained regressing in a logit model the dummy
variables (R=1 and E=0) obtained by the BBQ algorithm on transition variables (results avail-
able upon request).
13The correlation between the tax shock measure and F (zt) or (1− F (zt)) is equal to zero.
14In the transition function F (zt) (figure 3.5), the frequency of non-alterning points is high.
It depends on the characteristic of the transition variable zt. This is in line with Harding (2008)
which show that in the UK "the frequency of non-alterning points is four times higher than the
US". Of course, if zt has some non-alterning points, this characteristic will be amplified in the
transition function F (zt) in which those points are bounded between zero and one.
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According to Ramey and Zubairy (2014), the estimated coefficients in equation
(3.3) depend on the characteristic of the economy from time t to t+h, given the
initial conditions (the tax shock, the initial state of the economy, and the control
variables). Since the control variables in equation (3.3) do not change at each
horizon h, then the estimated coefficients on the covariates capture the average
transition of the economy from one state to another occurring in the sample. Also,
the estimated coefficients (θR,h and θE,h) on the 
Cloyne
t will reflect the effects of the
tax shock on the future state of economy. For example, suppose that a tax shock
has a negative effect on output in recessions and positive in expansions, and a tax
shock occurs in an expansionary period bringing the economy in a recessionary
one. Then, the estimated parameters θE,h will incorporate the transition of the
economy from the expansionary to the recessionary regime changing its values
from positive to negative.15
3.3.1 (Non Linear) Results
Figure 3.6 depicts the IRFs of macroeconomic indicators to an increase in the ex-
ogenous tax shock series of 1% of GDP, according to the two different regimes. No-
tice that in expansions IRFs are constructed as a sequence of estimated {θEh}20h=0,
whereas in recessions as {θRh}20h=0 one.16 The blue dotted lines denote the IRFs
in expansions, whereas the pink lines the ones in recessions.17 The dark and light
shaded area represent the 68% and 90% confidence intervals.18
15Using a SVAR we can account for this feedback only through Generalised IRFs, as in
Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari (2015). As noted by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy
(2013), the difference between GIRFs and LPIRFs is based on how the two IRFs account for this
feedback: in the GIRFs using the response at time t-1 to estimate the response at time t, whereas
in LPs computing the average h-period-ahead value forecast given the information set at time t.
See Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) for a careful discussion and comparison between the
GIRFs and the LPIRFs
16Notice that since dependent variables are transformed as in Hall (2009)) and Barro and
Redlick (2011) each point estimated of the IRF at time h correspond to the tax multiplier at
time h
17See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a), note 6, for analytic comparison between the
LPIRFs and the conventional IRFs.
18A confidence level of 68% is reported only for comparison reason since this level is quite
common in the relative literature.
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Focusing on the recessionary regime, the impact response of private consumption
is negative (-1%), hitting its lowest value (-4.5%) 8 quarters after the shock oc-
curs, then goes back to its steady-state. The investment decreases and reaches its
trough at -1%. Tax shock is found to affect statistically and negatively exports and
imports. On impact, imports decrease by -0.5% and, after it troughs at around
-3%, then gradually goes back to zero. The positive response of government con-
sumption in the first four quarters is not statistically significant. However, when
it troughs at -1.2%, the response becomes statistically significant. Overall, the
above effects translate in the output's response. Indeed, following a tax shock
the output decreases on impact by -1.2% and hits its lowest value at -4.9% eight
quarters after the shock, then gradually returns to the steady-state.
Next, we look at the response of macroeconomic aggregates to a tax shock in
expansions. On impact, a tax shock affects negatively consumption (-0.33%) but
positively investments (0.12%). However, both reactions are not statistically signif-
icant at 90% confidence intervals. Also, tax shock is found to not affect statistically
the impact reaction of imports and exports. Conversely, government consumption
reacts statistically significant and positively to a tax shock increasing on impact
by 0.2% and, after reaching its peak at 0.97, then gradually goes back to zero.
The reaction of output to tax shock it is not statistically significant for the first
sixteen quarters.
Are tax multipliers state-dependent? Table 3.4 reports cumulative tax multipliers
from one to five years for all the variables of interest computed, as in the linear
specification, à la Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).19 From columns (1) to
(3) the table reports tax multipliers for the recessionary, expansionary and linear
case, respectively. Bold numbers indicate the multipliers statistically significant
at the 90% level, whereas in brackets the 90% confidence intervals is reported.
19As in the linear specification, to obtain the estimated θRh and θEh coefficients of the variable
in denominator, we transform revenues as in (3.2), plug it in equation 3.3, and we run h equations.
For instance, to compute the cumulative multipliers in recessions,
∑H
h=1∆X˜R,t+h∑H
h=1∆
˜RevenuesR,t+h
, we
divide the sum of bootstrapped θRh of each variable of interest to the counterpart bootstrapped
θRh coefficients of revenues.
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In recessions, tax multipliers are statistically significant and negative for all the
variables considered. The output and private consumption cumulative multipliers
are always larger than one (in absolute value), even on impact. The multipliers
of imports quantitatively mimic the multipliers for consumption. Also for ex-
ports, tax multipliers are larger (in absolute value) than one. The multipliers of
investment are larger than one (in absolute value) only for the two-year cumula-
tive multiplier, while for government consumption the multipliers are negative but
smaller than one.
Turning on the expansionary cumulative tax multipliers, for output and private
consumption the multipliers are not statistically significant for the first four-years,
whereas for investment tax multipliers are negative and larger (in absolute value)
than in recessions for the four and five-year cumulative multipliers. For exports,
imports, and government consumption tax multipliers are positive and larger than
one.
Figure 3.6 and table 3.4 show that the effect of tax shocks varies across the busi-
ness cycle. In recessions, the increase in taxes reduces consumptions. This re-
sults accords with the analysis of Tagkalakis (2008): since the fraction of liquidity
constrained households is likely to increase, the increase in taxes decreases their
disposable income. A tighter fiscal policy decreasing the disposable income of
households has negative wealth effects, and therefore households consume less.
Conversely, in expansions the negative effect of an increase in taxes is counter-
acted by an increase in government consumption. It turns out that the reaction
of private consumption is not statistically significant. With regard to output, the
results have some similarities to consumption. In recessions, the shock decreases
output, but this effect disappears in expansions. Since in our sample consump-
tion represents 57% of GDP, the reaction of output is likely to be driven by the
reaction of consumption. This tendency also holds in expansions. Turning to
investment, our results show that an increase in taxes has negative effects, both
in recessions and in expansions. The increase in taxes reduces the business prof-
its and the investment financed by those profits. The response of imports and
exports is asymmetric across the business cycle. In recessions, imports strongly
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decrease likely because of the fall in income, and therefore in domestic demand for
foreign goods. The reaction of exports may depends on the exchange rate20 and
on external factors. Interestingly, imports and exports increase in expansions.
Overall, our results predict asymmetric effects of tax shocks across the business
cycle. The results can be read through the lenses of the AD-AS model. Suppose
that the economy is producing at its full employment level of natural income and
the aggregate supply curve is flat, and becomes steeper and steeper and vertical
at this point. If the economy starts from its equilibrium level and there is an
expansionary phase, the aggregate demand shifts rightwards and the impact on
output will be small, since the aggregate supply is almost vertical. The only
effect is on prices. If the economy is in expansions and the government increases
taxes, the new aggregate demand curve will shift towards to the original curve
leading to a small loss in output. If the economy is in recession, the original
aggregate demand shifts on the left. In this case, the movement of the aggregate
demand is happening in a point of the aggregate demand that lies flatter than
the one considered before. A backwards shift of the AD curve will affect output
negatively stronger than before. Suppose the economy is in a recessionary phase
and government increase taxes. This causes a further movement toward left yet
in even flatter part of the aggregate supply curve. The negative effects on output
of this policy intervention will be in absolute value stronger than the same policy
intervention that happens during expansions. The difference between the two
phases of the economy (recessions and expansion) lies on the relative position of
the AD-AS curves. In expansions, the AD curve is in the steeper part of the AS
curve and the effects on output are small. Conversely, in recessions the AD curve
is in the flatter part of the AS curve, and therefore the
∣∣∆Y
∆T
∣∣Rec > ∣∣∆Y
∆T
∣∣Exp.
20Notice that the UK has experimented different exchange rate regimes in the postwar period.
Indeed, until 1972 it was part of the Bretton Woods system. From 1972 to 1990 it adopted a
semi-managed floating regime. From 1990 to 1992 the UK was part of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism. From 1993 the UK has adopted a floating exchange rate regime. Studying
the reaction of the exchange rate to a tax shock is already in the agenda. However, it suffices
here to say that focusing on the subsample 1972-2009 -according to Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh
(2013) can be considered a flexible exchange rate regime- and adding among the covariates the
real exchange rate does not affect the results.
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Statistically evidences in favor of state-dependent tax multipliers. According to our
estimation the tax multipliers are state-dependent. To best of our knowledge, only
Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) have studied the non-linear effect of
tax shock in the UK (via a Threshold VAR), albeit focusing on the reaction of
output. They apply the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification strategy and
find that a tax increase has negative (−0.4) or positive (0.2) effect on the 1-
year output tax multiplier depending on whether the economy is in the "positive
output" regime or in the "negative" one, respectively. However, the estimated
multipliers are not statistically significant.21
To statistically support whether the multiplier are different according the regimes,
we test the difference between the multipliers estimated under recessionary and
expansionary regimes.22 We run this test for all our variables of interest. Table
3.5 reports the results. If the value of zero is not included in the confidence bands,
then there will be evidence of state-dependent tax multipliers. Indeed, we find
statistically significat evidences of non-linearity in the tax multipliers for the GDP
and private consumption during the second and third year. Turning to invest-
ments, table 3.5 shows that at longer horizon the zero value is not included in
the confidence bands. We find statistically evidences of non-linearity in the tax
multipliers for the exports, imports and government consumption tax multipliers.
Overall, whether we jointly read table 3.4 and table 3.5, there are statistically
evidences that tax multipliers in UK are state-dependent. Thus, evaluating tax
multipliers in a linear framework may lead to underestimate the effects of increas-
ing taxes in recessions and overestimated the ones in expansions. Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) highlight that for the recent recession the size of fiscal multipliers
21Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012) identify the tax shock in two steps. First of
all, they eliminate from the tax revenue series cases of revenues change not related to fiscal
policy decisions (i.e., movement in commodity price and asset). To this aim, they compare
the IMF (2010) action-based measure with the cyclical adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and
whether the divergence between the two measures was large, then revenue changes unrelated
to fiscal policy decision are removed from the revenue series. Doing that, the revenues series
reflects change in output and fiscal policy decisions. Secondly, to identify a structural tax shock
unrelated to movement in output they apply the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) procedure.
22The empirical density of the difference between multipliers is based on 10,000 realizations of
such differences for each horizon h.
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has been underestimated. We highlight that macroeconomic conditions can affect
fiscal multiplier estimates.
3.4 Robustness checks
Results highlight that tax multipliers in UK are state-dependent. In this section,
we check the robustness of our findings.
Alternative measure of tax shocks. We have identified the tax shock in
equation (3.1) and (3.3) via the contemporaneous value of the Cloyne tax shock
(Cloynet ). This specification is close to the Favero and Giavazzi (2012) one, given
that we also include in vector yt lagged values of revenues.
23 The reasons of this
specification are twofold. Firstly, we treat Cloynet as an observable and exogenous
shock to revenues.24 Secondly, this specification allows us to preserve degrees of
freedom given our sample size. Notice that we have extended the linear analysis
to the non-linear one. Whether the inclusion of lagged values of the Cloyne may
be not problematic in terms of degree of freedom in the linear specification, it will
be in the non-linear one since the parameters to be estimated double. However,
lagging the tax shock allows to account for the possibility of a partial revision to
tax shocks.
Another issue rises since tax shock is constructed on the base of policymakers'
intentions. For instance, policymakers may declare that tax changes are made
for reason unrelated to movements in macroeconomic variables, while in reality
they are concerned about these. We tackle the two above issues by regressing the
Cloynet on its own 12 lags and on the covariates that enter in vector yt. Then,
23Romer and Romer (2010) study the effect of a tax shock on the US GDP regressing the
GDP on the contemporaneous value and 12 lags of their tax measure. Favero and Giavazzi
(2012) add to the Romer and Romer (2010) specification some fiscal variables. They show that
the truncated moving average representation of Romer and Romer (2010) shocks give biased
estimates of the output reaction because of correlation between the Romer and Romer (2010)
shocks and distant lags of output and taxation. Because of that they identify the shock via the
contemporaneous value of the Romer and Romer (2010) shock (exogenous term) and treat it as
the structural shock of the one of the variable included in the VAR (revenues).
24Notice that correlation between the Cloynet and the lagged values of tax revenues, included
in vector yt, is low and range between 0.02 and 0.05.
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we select the number of terms of the MA(p) process by checking the statistical
significance of such terms. It turns out that p=4 is the last significant term of the
process. Thus, we identify the tax shock via the residual obtained regressing Cloynet
on its own 4 lags and on the covariates that enter in vector yt. In this way, we
identify a residual tax shock purged from the potential revision in tax changes and
movements of some macroeconomic variables. The correlation between the Cloynet
and the alternative (residual) tax shock measure is 0.94. We plug such residual in
equation (3.1) and (3.3) instead of Cloynet , and we estimate them. Figure (3.7) plots
the Cloyne tax measure (in our notation Cloynet ) versus the alternative measures of
tax shock identified by the residual of the above exercise, whereas table 3.6 reports
tax multipliers from this exercise. The results are in line with the ones obtained
in our baseline model (table 3.4).
The Cloyne's measure used to identify tax shocks includes, among the subcate-
gories, the tax shocks driven by "deficit consolidation" (DC, henceforth) motiva-
tions. As pointed out by Cloyne (2013), the "DC" subcategory is different from the
Romer and Romer (2010) one. In Romer and Romer (2010), the "DC" category
is treaded as exogenous because it reflects past shocks, not related to macroe-
conomic conditions. For instance, it captures an increase in taxes to reduce an
inherited deficit to long-run economic reasons. Conversely, Cloyne (2013) notes
that in the UK part of the tax changes due to fiscal consolidation are related to
current macroeconomic conditions (endogenous). For that reason, the "DC" in
Cloyne (2013) is more restrictive than in Romer and Romer (2010) one and, it
includes only 12 observations. Once again, since tax shock is constructed on the
base of policymakers' intentions, we verify the robustness of our results excluding
from the Cloyne the DC subcategory. Table 3.8 shows that our baseline results,
both in the linear and non-linear specification, are not affected.
Alternative specification. Francis and Ramey (2009) and Owyang, Ramey,
and Zubairy (2013) highlight the importance of including a quadratic trend in the
US post-WWII period because of the slow-moving demographics. We address this
issue for the UK replacing the linear time trend in equation (3.1) and (3.3) with
the quadratic one. The results from these exercises are reported in table 3.7.
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Furthermore, to control for monetary policy actions we add to the control vector
yt of equation (3.1) and (3.3) the policy rate and the inflation.
25 Table 3.11 shows
that adding other variables to our baseline specification, both in the linear and
non-linear specification, does not affect are results.
Alternative values of the smoothness parameter. We calibrate the smooth-
ness parameter γ to match the frequencies of the UK recessions obtained via
the BBQ algorithm (see Appendix 3B), in our sample 15%. Once again, we
(re)calibrate γ in order to include in our sample a number of recessions ranging
from 10% to 20%. The lower bound is set by the minimum amount of observa-
tions each regime should contain (Hansen, 1999). Table 3.9 and 3.10 show that
our results are robust to alternative calibrations of γ parameters.
Figure 3.8 and 3.9 plot the impulse responses of GDP and its components from
the above exercises. Our robustness checks confirm the non-linearity of tax shock
effects on real variables.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the non-linear effects of an exogenous tax increase in the UK.
The tax shock is identified by the new measure proposed by Cloyne (2013). We
model non-linearity via the combination of local projection technique (Jordá, 2005)
and smooth transition regressions (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1994). We find that
the sign and the size of tax multipliers on real variables change according to the
states of economy. In recessions, a positive tax shock dampens the economic ac-
tivity. The (negative) reaction of output is mainly driven by a fall in private
consumption. In expansions, output and consumptions do not respond to a tax
shock in the short-run. The reason can be found in the asymmetric reaction of
government consumption across the business cycle. Since in expansions govern-
ment consumption reacts positively to tax shocks, it plays an important role in
25The inflation rate is the annualized Retail Price Index, since the Consumer Price Index is
not available from 1955.
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counteracting the (negative) effect of such shock on output and consumption (but
not on investment).
Other studies in the literature, as Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013), find contrast-
ing results: a positive tax shock has expansionary effect (albeit close to zero) in
Perotti (2005), and contractionary one in Cloyne (2013). We reconcile these differ-
ences considering the state of the business cycles the economy is when exogenous
tax change occurs.
The results documented in this paper lead to new research questions. For exam-
ple, we have seen that following a tax shock the reaction of imports is different
according to the state of economy. It would be interesting to study whether the
UK tax shock has some (non-linear) spillover effects on its trade partner countries.
Moreover, Romer and Romer (2010) have constructed a narrative-based tax shock
measure for the US. It may worth studying the asymmetric effects of a tax shock
in the US and UK, to compare the non-linear effects of a tax shock in a relatively
close (US) versus a small open economy (UK).
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Table 3.1: Data Sources
Series Description Sources
GDP Real GDP ONS
Nominal GDP GDP in current prices ONS
Consumption Final household consumption expenditure ONS
Investment Gross fixed capital formation ONS
Imports Trade in goods and services: Total imports ONS
Exports Trade in goods and services: Total exports ONS
Population UK total population Eurostat
Inflation Change in Retail Prices Index ONS
Interest rate Official Bank rate Bank of England
Government consumption Government consumption of goods and services ONS
Tax revenues Total tax and NI receipts ONS
Cloyne's Tax Shocks Exogenous tax changes (Cloyne, 2013) AER's website
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Figure 3.1: Response of GDP to an exogenous tax shock
Notes: Figure shows the response of output to a tax shock corresponding to 1% of GDP. Blue
lines indicate the IRFs. The lightand dark shaded areas refer to the 68% and 90% confidence
intervals, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Response of GDP components to an exogenous tax shock
Notes: Figure shows the response of private consumption, investments, exports, imports, govern-
ment consumption and output to a tax shock corresponding to 1% of GDP. Blue lines indicate
the IRFs. The light and dark shaded areas refer to the 68% and 90% confidence intervals,
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Tax shock vs Business cycle
Notes: The shaded area indicate the UK recessionary phases (1955:I-2009:IV) identified by
applying the BBQ algorithm, whereas the red lines refers to the tax shock measure of Cloyne
(2013).
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Figure 3.4: Transition variable versus Business Cycle Dates
 
Notes: the transition variable is the standardized backward-looking moving average constructed
with two realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Shaded area referes to
the recessionary phase identified applying the BBQ algorithm (Harding and Pagan, 2002)
Figure 3.5: Probability of being in a recessionary phase
 
Notes: F (zt) computed according to the logistic function presented in the text. The transition
variable is the standardized backward-looking moving average constructed with two realizations
of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. The value of the slope parameter is 1.7.
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Figure 3.6: Response of GDP components to an exogenous tax shock in reces-
sions and expansions
Notes: Figure shows the response of private consumption, investments, exports, imports, gov-
ernment consumption and output to a tax shock corresponding to 1% of GDP. Black dotted
lines refer to IRFs computed in a linear specification, whereas the pink and the blue dotted ones
to IRFs in recessions and expansions, respectively. The dark and light shaded area refer to the
68% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Cloyne shocks and its exogeneity
Notes: The figure plots the tax shock series constructed by Cloyne (2013), in our notation Cloynet ,
versus the (residual) tax shock series obtained regressing the Cloynet on its own four lags and
four lags of the log real GDP, revenues and government consumption.
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Figure 3.8: Robustness checks: response of GDP and its components to an
exogenous tax change in recessions
Notes: Figures show the impulse responses of private consumption, investments, exports, im-
ports, government consumption and output to a tax shock corresponding to 1% of GDP under
alternative specifications.
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Figure 3.9: Robustness checks: response of GDP and its components to an
exogenous tax change in expansions
Notes: Figures show the impulse responses of private consumption, investments, exports, im-
ports, government consumption and output to a tax shock corresponding to 1% of GDP under
alternative specifications.
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Appendix 3A
Output Elasticity of Revenues and conversion factors of elasticity into
multiplier: Do they matter for the Tax Multiplier?
The main challenge in estimating the tax multiplier is to disentangle a tax change
due to a discretionary fiscal policy from a nondiscretionary component, e.g. the
change in taxes due to a change in output. Two methods have been proposed in
the literature. The first one relies on the SVAR model and based mainly on the
identification assumption scheme pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The
second one identifies an exogenous tax change using a narrative method (Romer
and Romer, 2010; Mertens and Ravn, 2014; Cloyne, 2013). Despite several studies
investigating tax multipliers there is not a shared view. Perotti (2005), identifying
a tax shock via coefficient restrictions, finds that following a tax shock the UK
GDP decrease. Cloyne (2013) identify a tax shock through the narrative approach
and finds that a tax cut stimulates the economy. In general, the size and duration
of a tax shock vary across studies and the estimated tax multiplier via a SVAR
model tend to be lower than the narrative approach.
Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that contrasting US fiscal multiplier estimations
are likely due to different assumptions on the size of the elasticity of tax revenues
to GDP. The first question addressed in this section is whether the UK output tax
multiplier is "output elasticity of taxes dependent". To do that we employ in very
basic (linear) SVARs two measure of the UK automatic stabilizer proposed in the
literature by Perotti (2005) and Cloyne (2013).
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Consider a simple three-variate VAR as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)26 of the
form:
Xt = C(L)Xt−1 + ut t = 1, ..., T (3A.1)
where Xt includes four lags of the log real per capita government consumption,
tax revenues and GDP and ut is a three-dimensional vector of residuals. Equation
(3A.1) includes also a constant and a linear time trend. Following the approach
proposed by Perotti (2005), the reduced form innovations of vector ut is expressed
as a linear combination of the structural shocks such that:
uGt = α
G
Y u
Y
t + β
G
T 
T
t + 
G
t (3A.2)
uTt = α
T
Y u
Y
t + β
T
G
G
t + 
T
t (3A.3)
uYt = α
Y
Gu
G
t + α
Y
T u
T
t + 
Y
t (3A.4)
Since the aim is estimating the effect of a tax shock Tt on the GDP, let us focus on
equation (3A.3). It states that unexpected movement in taxes at time t may be
due to output innovations (uYt ), structural shocks to government consumption (
G
t )
or to taxes (Tt ) . Hence, the coefficients α
i
j capture the elasticity of variable i to
the variable j, while coefficients βij capture possible link between structural shocks
to fiscal variable which may arise whether, for instance, government consumption
instantaneously responds to revenues change with government consumption ad-
justment. The identification of a tax shock is based on the Aut=Bt scheme and
on some restrictions on the matrix A and B to map from innovations uTt to the
26Notice that Perotti (2005) estimates for the UK a five-variable VAR. Caldara and Kamps
(2008) show that the different results in the literature about the US fiscal multipliers are not due
to difference in the specification of the reduced-form models but to the different identification
strategies. We stress that the exercise provided in this section is not aimed at choosing the best
specification for our analysis but to understand whether the Caldara and Kamps' result is valid
also for the UK economy. Hence, we estimate a more parsimonious VAR, as in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002).
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structural shocks Tt . Expressed in matrix notation:
1 0 −αGY
0 1 −αTY
−αGY −αYT 1


uGt
uTt
uYt
 =

σG βGT 0
βTG σ
T 0
0 0 σY


Gt
Tt
Yt
 (3A.5)
The identification of fiscal shock in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) relies on some
assumptions about the reaction lags and the structural elasticity. Suppose that
there is a negative output shock. To offset such shock a fiscal policy action should
be planned, approved by the House of Commons and then implemented. It should
take more than one quarter to apply a discretionary fiscal policy. With quarterly
data the contemporaneous response of the government spending to an output shock
can be set to zero. Also, the implementation lags imply that coefficient αTY captures
only the automatic elasticity of the tax revenues to GDP due to a fluctuation in
the tax base. Thus, the cyclically-adjusted tax innovation, uCATt , is given by the
difference between the tax innovation (uTt ) and the output elasticity of revenues
(αTY ). Notice that the restricted value of the coefficient α
T
Y is obtained by an out-
of-model information.27 Hence, the cyclical adjusted tax innovation derives from
an instrumental variable estimation. The structural shock Tt is recovered imposing
a recursive order on matrix A, on which we assume that tax shock "comes first"
than government spending one. Thus, we set βTG=0.
28
Estimated impulse response functions obtained via the estimation of (3A.5) allow
us to address a second problem, the ex post conversion factor's, raised by Owyang,
Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). It is related to the estimation of fiscal multipliers. In
general, it is common practice in the fiscal multiplier literature to run SVARs using
27Perotti (2005) calibrates the value of the automatic stabilizer for the UK economy through
the OECD method and assumptions proposed by Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den
Noord (1995) and van den Noord (2002). The output elasticity of output is calibrated combining
the estimation of elasticity of tax revenues to their tax base with the elasticity of tax base to
output. The corporate and indirect taxes is equal to 1 by assumption. Moreover, the computation
of the automatic stabilizer excludes output elasticity to GDP cyclical effects on tax expenditure,
income of self-employed, capital gains, for example. See Perotti (2005) and Mertens and Ravn
(2014) in depth analysis.
28 Our results are robust to the alternative specification that government spending "comes
first" than taxes shock. The results are available upon request.
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log-transformed variables, and then to convert estimated elasticities into multipli-
ers via (ex post) conversion factors, e.g. the average of the ratio GDP/(fiscal
variable). However, Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) highlight that different
sample size may rend different conversion factor values, which may lead to biased
fiscal multiplier estimates.
Output Elasticity of Revenues and conversion factors of elasticity into multiplier:
Do they matter for the Tax Multiplier? This paper address the two problems
through simple exercises. We consider two sample sizes spanning one from 1963:I
to 2001:II, and the other one from 1955:I to 2009:IV. For each sample size, we esti-
mate two SVARs including the quarterly log of the real government consumption,
tax revenues and GDP,29and imposing the implementation lag coefficient restric-
tions discussed above. Notice that for each sample size two alternative coefficient
restrictions of output elasticity of taxes (αTY ) are set. On the one hand, we set
αTY=0.76 as in Perotti (2005). On the other hand, we fix α
T
Y=1.61 as estimated
by Cloyne (2013) using narrative data on tax changes.30 To obtain tax multi-
pliers from (four) estimated SVARs, we convert estimated elasticities (since our
variables are expressed in logarithm terms) into multipliers via ex post conversion
factors. For each sample size and value of αTY , we convert the elasticity into multi-
pliers using the minimum, the mean and the maximum value of the average of the
ratio GDP/T of the sample size under analysis.31 The 90% confidence intervals
are computed using 10,000 bootstrapping replications. Figure 3A.1 depicts the
IRFs. The top panels show the response of output to a tax shock for the period
1963:I to 2001:II, whereas the bottom ones for the period spanning from 1955:I
to 2009:IV. The left hand side panels depict the results for the two different sam-
ple when αTY = 0.76 (Perotti), whereas the right ones when α
T
Y = 1.61 (Cloyne).
Each plot reports the point estimates multiplied by different conversion factors:
the mean (blue diamond line), the minimum (red line), and the maximum (dotted
29All SVARs are estimated including a constant and a linear time trend.
30The exercises on two samples are justified because the Perotti's output elasticity of taxes is
calibrated for the period 1963:I to 2001:II, whereas the estimation of Cloyne is related to the
sample 1955:I-2009:IV.
31For the sample size 1963:I-2001:II the mean, minimum and maximum of the ratio GDP/T
are 3.19, 2.83 and 3.9, respectively. Regard to the sample size 1955:I to 2009:IV, the mean,
minimum and maximum of the above ratio are 3.25, 2.83 and 4.02, respectively.
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red line). Figure 3A.1 show that, for each sample size, increasing the value of
αTY the impact of tax shock on output increases. Moreover, the value of α
T
Y has
an impact on the persistence of the shock. That is evident whether we consider
table 3A.1 which reports the cumulative multipliers, for the different sample size,
coefficient restrictions, and conversion factors. Let us focus on the sample size
A (1963:I -2001:II) and on the row reporting tax multipliers using as conversion
factor the mean of GDP/T, mean (A). The estimated 1-year integral multiplier
(4Q) is −0.3 setting αTY = 0.76, whereas doubles setting αTY = 1.61. Moreover, the
value of αTY has effects on the persistence of the shock. Indeed, whereas the 2-year
integral multiplier (8Q) tax multiplier is not statistically significant for αTY = 0.76,
it is for αTY = 1.61. Turning on panel B, the 1-year integral tax multiplier (4Q)
is statistically significant only when αTY = 1.61. Further, using different value of
conversion factors affects the size of output tax multipliers. For example, this bias
is evidence focusing on the 2-year integral multipliers (8Q) of panel A, for which
tax multipliers range below and above one.
The results show that using the same dataset, the same estimation's method but
different coefficient restrictions on the output stabilizer yield different results. This
is consistent with Caldara and Kamps (2008): the fiscal multipliers change accord-
ing to the calibration of the output elasticity of taxes. Moreover, the combination
of coefficient restrictions with the value of ex post conversion factors may lead
other bias on tax multiplier estimates.
An exogenous tax change measure based on the narrative method does not require
imposing restrictions on the output elasticity of taxes. A solution to avoid ex post
conversion problem is to convert GDP and taxes to the same units ex ante the
estimation. Hence, we identify the tax shock via the tax shock measure proposed
by proposed by Cloyne (2013), and to avoid bias on tax multipliers we transform
the variables as in Hall (2009), Barro and Redlick (2011) and Owyang, Ramey,
and Zubairy (2013).
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Figure 3A.1: Perotti and Cloyne's output elasticity of revenues in a SVAR
specification
Notes: Top panels show the response of output to a tax shock for the period 1963:I to 2001:II,
whereas the bottom panels the one for the period 1955:I-2009:IV. The left panels refer to the
case in which the output elasticity is set to 0.76 Perotti (2005), whereas the right ones refer to
an automatic stabilizer set to 1.61 Cloyne (2013). The blue, red and dotted red lines depict the
IRFs obtained using as ex post conversion factor the average, the minimum and the maximum
of the ratio of GDP to revenues, respectively.
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Table 3A.1: Multipliers estimated relying on different sample size, coefficient
restrictions, and conversion factors
Sample size CF Perotti (αTY = 0.76) Cloyne (α
T
Y = 1.61)
4Q 8Q 4Q 8Q
(A) 1963:I-2001:II min (A) -0.22 −0.39 -0.56 -0.88
mean (A) -0.30 −0.44 -0.62 -1.00
max (A) -0.37 −0.55 -0.79 -1.24
(B) 1955:I-2009:IV min (B) −0.06 0.05 -0.40 −0.59
mean (B) −0.07 0.06 -0.48 −0.67
max (B) −0.09 0.07 -0.60 −0.83
Notes: Top rows show the response of output to a tax shock for the period 1963:I to 2001:II,
whereas the bottom rows the one for the period 1955:I-2009:IV. The left column refers to the
case in which the output elasticity is set to 0.76 Perotti (2005), whereas the right ones refers
to an automatic stabilizer set to 1.61 Cloyne (2013). Bold numbers indicate the coefficients
statistically significant at 90%.
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Appendix 3B
Business cycle identification via BQQ
There is not in the UK an official dating Committee, as the NBER, which has
established an expansion and recession chronology and which has been recognized
as an authoritative dating of the cycle.32 The NBER (2001) defines a recession as
"a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more than few
months, visible in industrial production, employment, real income, and wholesale-
retail trade. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity
and ends as the economy reaches its trough". According to the literature turning
points can be defined in terms of absolute decline in output (classical cycle) or
in terms of deviation of GDP growth rate from its trend (deviation cycle). The
deviation-from-trend approach, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Stock and
Watson (2008), requires detrending a series. However, several detrending meth-
ods exist. For example, the NBER uses the phase-average trend method (PAT),
the macroeconomists use Hodrick-Prescott filter or the "band pass" to remove de-
terministic/stochastic trend. According to Canova (1998) the identified business
cycle may depend on the filter used. Moreover, Harding and Pagan (2002) high-
light that smoothing methods are aimed at simplifying turning point identification
removing idiosyncratic variation. Thus, if turning points are detected using quar-
terly data series the utility of smoothing methods decreases with such frequency
data. Hence, we identify turning points relying on the classical cycle approach.
We use the dating algorithm proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) which is the
quarterly version of the well-known monthly Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm.33
32In 2002 CEPR established a Business Cycle Dating Committee for the euro area.
33The BBQ is one of the most widespread algorithm in detecting turning points. For example,
Artis, Marcellino, and Proietti (2002) rely on the BBQ to analyse the characteristic of the
business cycle. However, there are other algorithm that we may use to date turning points,
for example a Markov Switching model Hamilton (1998). As point out by Harding and Pagan
(2002) the Markov Switching model depends on the relative statistical framework.
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The BBQ algorithm isolates local minimum and maximum points in a quarterly
series, via some constraints. First of all, a local peak (trough) occurs at time t
when
yt > (<)yt±k (3A.6)
where k=1,2,..K. K allows yt to be a local local peak (trough) to two quarters
on either side.34 Secondly, the phases alternate between peak and trough. This
because whether the phases alternate, then it is possible to distinguish the phase
of recession (from peak to trough) from the expansion one (from trough to peak).35
Thirdly, a complete cycle (from peak to peak or from trough to trough) lasts at
least n quarters. The last two rules are known as censoring rule.
To verify the validity of the BBQ a natural exercise is to apply the algorithm to
the US for which exists an official chronology. We set for the US k=2 and the
duration of the complete cycle to five quarters, as in Harding and Pagan (2002),
and we apply the algorithm to the log-real GDP. Then, the turning points are
compared with the NBER data. Figure 3B.1 plots the NBER turning points (red
lines) versus the turning point identified by the BBQ ones (shaded area). Since
1955 to 2009 the NBER has recorded 9 recessions, whereas the algorithm does
not capture the turning points of 2001. Stock and Watson (2010) report that
the NBER committee for dating relies on the quarterly real GDP and on four
monthly variables, such as real personal income less transfer, real manufacturing
and wholesaleretail trade sales, industrial production, and nonfarm employment.
They highlight that those series do not receive same weight in the dating procedure.
34 Notice that larger is the value of K the more restrictive is the definition of the turning points
(Harding (2008)).
35Harding (2008) show that in UK the frequency of non-alternating turning points is four
times higher than the US
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Figure 3B.1: US Business Cycle Chronology (NBER vs BBQ algorithm)
Notes: The shaded area indicate the recession phases identified by the BBQ algorithm, whereas
the red lines show the NBER business cycle chronology. The sample size spans from 1955:I to
2009:IV
Moreover, Harding (2003) shows that the procedure and variables used by the
NBER for the business cycle chronology has changed over time. Also, Harding
(2008) report that in detecting the turning points the NBER uses not only com-
mittee's procedure but also a voting procedure that can complicate the perfect
matching of the BBQ dating turning points with the NBER one. Thus, some dif-
ference between the two procedures mat be due to such reasons. Apart of turning
point of 2001 that is not captured because it does not exhibit two quarters of
negative growth (Harding (2008)) and keeping in mind the above problems, our
exercise reproduces the turning points from the NBER. Overall, the BBQ algo-
rithm performs well on the US. After having run the above test, we apply the BBQ
algorithm to the UK. We apply the BBQ algorithm to log-real GDP and we set
k=2 and fix the duration of the business cycle to four quarters differently from the
US exercise. This because Harding and Pagan (2002) find difficulties to identify
for the UK the strong downturn of 1974 with a complete cycle of five quarter. The
recession of 1974 was characterized by a complete cycle of 4. Hence, for the UK a
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duration of the complete cycle of four can be applied.
Figure 3B.2: UK Turning Points
Notes: The shaded area indicate the UK recession phases (1955:I-2009:IV) identified by the ap-
plication of the BBQ algorithm on the log-real UK GDP (red line).
Figure 3B.2 shows the identified turnings points for the UK via the application
of BBQ algorithm to the log-real GDP. From 1955 to 2009 we identify seven re-
cessions. The number of UK recessions identified via the BBQ matches that ones
reported from the Bank of England in the Inflation Report (Bank of England
(2014)). The only exception concerns the recessions of 1970s that are treated as a
single recession by the BoE. The turning points identified by the BBQ algorithm
is going to be used as benchmark for studying the state-dependent tax multiplier.
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